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SCHOOL SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
JASON P. NANCE∗
In the aftermath of several highly publicized incidents of school violence,
public school officials have increasingly turned to intense surveillance methods to
promote school safety. The current jurisprudence interpreting the Fourth
Amendment generally permits school officials to employ a variety of strict
measures, separately or in conjunction, even when their use creates a prison-like
environment for students. Yet, not all schools rely on such strict measures. Recent
empirical evidence suggests that low-income and minority students are much
more likely to experience intense security conditions in their schools than other
students, even after taking into account factors such as neighborhood crime,
school crime, and school disorder. These empirical findings are problematic on
two related fronts. First, research suggests that students subjected to these intense
surveillance conditions are deprived of quality educational experiences that other
students enjoy. Second, the use of these measures perpetuates social inequalities
and exacerbates the school-to-prison pipeline.
Under the current legal doctrine, students have almost no legal recourse to
address conditions creating prison-like environments in schools. This Article
offers a reformulated legal framework under the Fourth Amendment that is rooted
in the foundational Supreme Court cases evaluating students’ rights under the
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The historical justification courts
invoke to abridge students’ constitutional rights in schools, including their Fourth
Amendment rights, is to promote the educational interests of the students. This
justification no longer holds true when a school creates a prison-like environment
that deteriorates the learning environment and harms students’ educational
interests. This Article maintains that in these circumstances, students’ Fourth
Amendment rights should not be abridged but strengthened.
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I grew up on the West Side of Chicago, where I attended and
graduated from Orr Academy High School. My high school
seemed like its own personal prison. From the moment we
stepped through the doors in the morning, we were faced with
metal detectors, x-ray machines and uniformed security. Upon
entering the school, it was like we stepped into a prison.
—Edward Ward,
Testimony for the U.S. Senate Committee Hearing on
“Ending the School-to-Prison Pipeline.”1
INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, I taught math in a public middle school located in
a large metropolitan city. Approximately 95 percent of the students
attending this school were Hispanic or African American, and nearly all
of the students came from low-income households and qualified for free
or reduced school lunch. Having attended public schools in
homogeneous, suburban areas with relatively low poverty rates, I was
unprepared for what I experienced during my first year of teaching. At

1.
Ending the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. 1 (2012) (testimony of Edward Ward, Blocks Together, Dignity in Schools
Campaign) [hereinafter Edward Ward Testimony], available at http://www.judiciary.
senate.gov/pdf/12-12-12WardTestimony.pdf.
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the public schools I attended, students had substantial freedom. There
were no police officers on campus. I never walked through a metal
detector. My personal belongings were never searched. I never saw a
drug-sniffing dog. There were no surveillance cameras. I was free to
leave campus at lunchtime. I felt that my teachers and administrators
trusted me, and I trusted them. Overall, my public school experience
helped me become independent and prepared me well for college and
many of the challenges I now face.
Students attending the school at which I worked, however, had a
very different educational experience from mine. At times, students
walked through metal detectors. Police officers maintained a visible
presence in the school. Students were not permitted to use lockers, and
they could only carry clear backpacks. After class ended, students
marched in a line to their next class. Students were not allowed to use the
restrooms during breaks between classes but used them as a group during
class time in the presence of a teacher. Before classes began, students
were not permitted to walk around in the school, go to the library, sit
outside, or even sit at their desks. Rather, students were required to sit on
the floor in the hallways or the gymnasium until the first bell rang when
they would march to their first class. There was also a clear sense of
distrust that I had to work hard to overcome, especially as a white
teacher.
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court issued the landmark
ruling of Brown v. Board of Education2 to address the racial inequalities
that existed in the public school system.3 That ruling eliminated the
“separate but equal” doctrine established in Plessy v. Ferguson4 as
applied to public schools and no longer allowed public schools to
segregate students solely on the basis of race.5 The Court in Brown
recognized that education “is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”6 The Court
reasoned that segregating children on the basis of race “generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”7 The sense

2.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3.
Id. at 493.
4.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (“We conclude that, in the field of public education
the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. . . . [P]laintiffs . . . by reason of the
segregation complained of, [are] deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
6.
Id. at 493.
7.
Id. at 494.
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of inferiority is magnified when sanctioned by law and “affects the
motivation of a child to learn.”8
More than fifty years after Brown, great racial inequalities still exist
in our public education system—inequalities that may generate feelings
of inferiority and affect the hearts and minds of children in a way that is
difficult to undo. Much scholarly attention has been devoted to
discussing many of these inequalities, including resource disparities in
schools that minorities attend and minorities’ disproportionate exposure
to exclusionary measures.9 The focus of this Article, however, addresses
another inequality that has received far less attention in the legal
scholarship: the implementation of strict security measures in schools
serving primarily minority students. Such measures include using metal
detectors, conducting random sweeps for contraband, having law
enforcement present on campus, controlling access to school grounds by
locking or monitoring gates, and installing security cameras.
Recent empirical research indicates that schools serving higher
proportions of minority and low-income students are more likely to
implement these harsh, intense security conditions than other schools—
even after accounting for factors such as school crime, neighborhood
crime, school disorder, school location, and school size.10 This is a
problem that must be addressed for at least two reasons. First, research
suggests that schools that rely on intense surveillance methods often have
poor school climates that are detrimental to student learning and positive
student growth, meaning that poor students and students of color often do

8.
Id.
9.
See, e.g., Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources
and the Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 404–09 (2012)
(explaining the inferior resources and opportunities that low-income minorities receive);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 AM.
U. L. REV. 1461, 1470–72 (2003) (describing the substantial disparities in school
funding); Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 VAND. L. REV.
2417, 2436–42 (2004) (discussing school finance reform); Catherine Y. Kim, Policing
School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 866 (2012) (discussing several empirical
studies that demonstrate racial disparities in school punishment); James E. Ryan, Schools,
Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999) (describing the funding gaps relative to
low-income minority students); see also DANIEL J. LOSEN & JONATHAN GILLESPIE, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF
DISCIPLINARY
EXCLUSION
FROM
SCHOOL
(2012),
available
at
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/
school-to-prison-folder/federal-reports/upcoming-ccrr-research/losen-gillespieopportunity-suspended-2012.pdf (analyzing national data from the U.S. Department of
Education’s Office of Civil Rights showing racial disparities in suspensions).
10.
See Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1, 41
(2013).
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not enjoy the same educational experiences that other students do.11
Second, the use of intense surveillance methods is a component of a
larger, more complex problem called the school-to-prison pipeline. The
school-to-prison pipeline refers to the practice of funneling students
currently enrolled in school to the juvenile justice system or removing
students from school temporarily or permanently, thereby creating
conditions under which the students are more likely to end up in prison.12
Many school officials use intense surveillance techniques in conjunction
with zero-tolerance policies to push low-performing students who are
perceived as troublemakers out of school.13 Unfortunately, minority
students—especially
African-American
male
students—are
disproportionately affected by such policies, leading to tremendous
inequalities in both our public schools and our justice system.14
This Article goes beyond the current literature by proposing a new
framework for evaluating the constitutionality of suspicionless search
practices in schools under the Fourth Amendment. Under the current
framework, using metal detectors, drug-sniffing dogs, security cameras,
random sweeps, or a combination of these practices in conjunction with
locked gates and law enforcement officers, is permitted because
preventing school crime is an important government interest that
overrides students’ expectations of privacy.15 This holds true even
though low-income and minority students are subjected to these
conditions more often. This Article proposes a reformulated legal
framework to address these issues that is rooted in the foundational
Supreme Court cases evaluating students’ rights under the First, Fourth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. The historical justification for diluting
students’ constitutional rights in schools—including their Fourth
Amendment rights—is to promote students’ educational interests by

11.
Cf. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., New Data from U.S. Department of
Education Highlights Educational Inequities around Teacher Experience, Discipline and
High School Rigor (Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/new-data-us-department-education-highlights-educational-inequities-aroundteache (detailing the inequalities that exist for minorities in the public education system
across the country and explaining that “[t]he undeniable truth is that the everyday
educational experience for many students of color violates the principle of equity at the
heart of the American promise”).
12.
See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., FEDERAL POLICY, ESEA
REAUTHORIZATION, AND THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 2 (2011), available at
http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/ceb35d4874b0ffde10_ubm6baeap.pdf; School to Prison
Pipeline, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, http://www.naacpldf.org/case/schoolprison-pipeline (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
13.
See infra Part II.
14.
See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 12, at 2–3; School to
Prison Pipeline, supra note 12.
15.
See infra Part III.A.
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providing an environment that is conducive to learning.16 This Article
maintains that when this justification no longer holds true—when
conducting suspicionless searches or, worse, creating a prison-like
environment contributes to a deteriorated learning climate and harms
students’ educational interests—students’ Fourth Amendment rights
should not be abridged, but strengthened. Accordingly, students should
have the opportunity to submit evidence showing that strict security
measures do not promote their educational interests but detract from an
educational climate, and thus their privacy interests should be given
greater consideration against the government’s interest in conducting
these searches. Such a test more closely aligns with the overall tenor of
cases evaluating students’ constitutional rights in schools and is more
consistent with good education policy and practice. Further, because
primarily students of color more often are subjected to intense
surveillance environments, applying this test will help ameliorate the
disproportionate use of strict security measures against minorities.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the empirical
evidence revealing disparities in the use of strict security measures along
racial and economic lines. Part II contextualizes the empirical evidence,
explaining why schools rely on strict security measures and how their
use is inconsistent with good educational and social policy and
contributes to the school-to-prison pipeline. Part III proposes a
reformulated legal framework to evaluate the constitutionality of
suspicionless searches under the Fourth Amendment that may help
prevent the disparate application of strict security measures and provide a
better learning environment for all students.
I. THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The unequal treatment of minorities in public schools, especially of
black males, is well documented and remains one of the most pressing
educational issues of our day.17 Nancy Dowd explains that for many
16.
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (stating that the Court,
in evaluating students’ Fourth Amendment rights, must “strike the balance between the
schoolchild’s legitimate expectations of privacy and the school’s equally legitimate need
to maintain an environment in which learning can take place”); see also Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) (explaining that the nature of students’
Fourth Amendment rights in schools “is what is appropriate for children in school” and
further stating that “Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere; the ‘reasonableness’
inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children”).
17.
See, e.g., CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE:
STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 53–54 (2010) (observing that minority students are
over-represented in restrictive special education programs); Angela A. Ciolfi & James E.
Ryan, Race and Response-to-Intervention in Special Education, 54 HOW. L.J. 303,
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minority students, particularly black males, “school is not a place of
education and opportunity. Instead, it is a place that significantly
undermines opportunity and pushes [them] into the juvenile justice
system.”18 Pedro Noguera observes that in schools throughout United
States, black males “are more likely than any other group in American
society to be punished (typically through some form of exclusion),
labeled, and categorized for special education (often without an apparent
disability), and to experience academic failure.”19 Recent data
disseminated by the U.S Department of Education’s Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) confirmed the disparate treatment of minority students in
public schools.20 That data, gathered from surveys from over 72,000
schools around the United States serving approximately 85 percent of the
nation’s public school students, show that minority students are
disciplined more often and more severely, have less access to complex,
higher-level courses, and more often are assigned teachers that are less
experienced and are lower paid.21 Responding to these findings, U.S.
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan declared that “[t]he undeniable
truth is that the everyday educational experience for many students of
color violates the principle of equity at the heart of the American

326–27 (2011) (showing that black students are “over-represented in more restrictive
educational settings such as separate classrooms or schools”); Nancy E. Dowd, What
Men? The Essentialist Error of the “End of Men,” 93 B.U. L. REV. 1205, 1216–22 (2013)
(explaining that minorities, particularly black males, are physically marginalized,
psychologically and socially isolated, disproportionately disciplined, have less access to
mental health services, but are more likely to be referred to an under-resourced mental
health system); Theresa Glennon, Knocking against the Rocks: Evaluating Institutional
Practices and the African American Boy, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 10, 11 (2002)
(stating that black males are more likely to be labeled as disabled and are more likely to
be referred to educational programs that provide fewer services and institute greater
control); Theresa Glennon, Looking for Air: Excavating Destructive Educational and
Racial Policies to Build Successful School Communities, in JUSTICE FOR KIDS: KEEPING
KIDS OUT OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 107, 110–11 (Nancy E. Dowd ed., 2011)
[hereinafter Glennon, Looking for Air] (citing several studies that show that minority
students are disproportionately disciplined); Russell J. Skiba, Suzanne E. Eckes & Kevin
Brown, African American Disproportionality in School Discipline: The Divide between
Best Evidence and Legal Remedy, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1071, 1086–89 (2010)
(discussing empirical evidence of racial disproportionality in school discipline). Indeed,
providing equal, high-quality education opportunities for all students is one of the
greatest challenges our nation faces today. See generally DEREK W. BLACK, EDUCATION
LAW: EQUALITY, FAIRNESS, AND REFORM (2013); LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT
WORLD AND EDUCATION: HOW AMERICA’S COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE
OUR FUTURE (2010).
18.
See Dowd, supra note 17, at 1216.
19.
PEDRO A. NOGUERA, THE TROUBLE WITH BLACK BOYS AND OTHER
REFLECTIONS ON RACE, EQUITY, AND THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION xvii (2008).
20.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 11.
21.
Id.
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promise.”22 Daniel Losen and Jonathan Gillespie conducted additional
analysis on the OCR data and found that one out of every six black
students enrolled in K–12 public schools has been suspended at least
once, but only one out of twenty white students has been suspended.23
Further, they found that one out of every four disabled black children
was suspended during the 2009–10 school year.24
Unfortunately, the OCR data do not allow researchers to probe
deeply into reasons behind the disparities because the data do not list the
offenses that led to the suspensions.25 However, other studies indicate
that minority students, especially black students, are indeed punished
disproportionately relative to their violations of school rules.26 For
example, Kelly Welch and Allison Ann Payne conducted a national
study involving 294 public schools and discovered that schools serving
higher percentages of black students were more likely to suspend, expel,
or refer students to law enforcement officials for violating school rules.27
Welch and Payne also discovered that schools serving higher percentages
of black and low-income students were less likely to rely on softer forms
of punishment, such as oral reprimands or referrals to visit with school
counselors.28 In addition, Welch and Payne found that schools serving
more black students were less likely to consider alternative forms of
discipline such as requiring students to complete community service or
participate in restorative justice initiatives.29 Indeed, the OCR recently

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
LOSEN & GILLESPIE, supra note 9, at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 32–33.
See TONY FABELO ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR.,
BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW SCHOOL DISCIPLINE RELATES
TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 45 (2011), available at
http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Breaking_Schools_Rules_
Report_Final.pdf (reporting the results of a statewide Texas study showing that black
students were more likely to be removed from class and more likely to be disciplined for
“discretionary reasons”); DANIEL J. LOSEN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, DISCIPLINE
POLICIES, SUCCESSFUL SCHOOLS, AND RACIAL JUSTICE 4–5 (2011), available at
http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/NEPC-SchoolDiscipline.pdf (demonstrating that racial
disparities in the number of school suspensions has increased considerably over the last
forty years); Catherine P. Bradshaw et al., Multilevel Exploration of Factors Contributing
to Overrepresentation of Black Students in Office Disciplinary Referrals, 102 J. EDUC.
PSYCHOL. 508, 511–12 (2010) (reporting that black students were more likely than white
students to receive office referrals after controlling for teachers’ ratings of their students’
classroom behavior); Ciolfi & Ryan, supra note 17, at 327–28 (citing several studies
showing that minority students are punished disproportionality relative to their offenses).
27.
See Kelly Welch & Allison Ann Payne, Racial Threat and Punitive School
Discipline, 57 SOC. PROBS. 25, 25, 36 (2010)
28.
Id. at 36–37.
29.
Id. at 37.
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acknowledged that although the racial disparities in student discipline
rates may be caused by a range of factors, the abundant research suggests
that these disparities “are not explained by more frequent or more serious
misbehavior by students of color.”30
While many studies demonstrate the disparate treatment of
minorities in schools in several facets,31 very few examine the
disproportionate use of strict security measures on minorities. I recently
tested the hypothesis that low-income and minority students are subject
to intense surveillance methods more often than other students, even
after taking into account additional factors that might influence a school
official’s decision to implement strict security measures.32 To test this
hypothesis, I analyzed restricted data from the U.S. Department of
Education’s 2009–10 School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS). The
SSOCS is a rich, national dataset that contains information submitted by
school principals dealing with school security practices, school crime,
and school demographics.33 The dataset was the restricted version,
meaning that the data contained detailed, sensitive information such as
the number of incidents that involved weapons or drugs that occurred on
school campuses during the school year.34 The restricted dataset recently
became available to researchers who met specific conditions.35

30.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE
LETTER ON NONDISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 4 n.7 (Jan. 8,
2014), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201401title-vi.pdf [hereinafter DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER].
31.
See, e.g., supra note 17.
32.
For a detailed description of the data, analysis, and findings see Nance,
supra note 10, at 28. In this Article, I briefly summarize the most important findings.
33.
See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, SCHOOL
SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY PRINCIPAL QUESTIONNAIRE: 2009–10 SCHOOL YEAR 5
[hereinafter 2009–10 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE], available at http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/
ssocs/pdf/SSOCS_2010_Questionnaire.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
34.
See Statistical Standards Program: Getting Started, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATS., http://nces.ed.gov/statprog/instruct_gettingstarted.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
The restricted-use data has “a higher level of detail in the data compared to public-use
data files.” Id. Although the restricted datasets are not available to the general public,
datasets that contain less sensitive data for prior school years are currently available. Id.
Those datasets can be downloaded at School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS),
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ssocs/data_products.asp
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
35.
NCES provides restricted-use datasets to certain researchers in qualified
organizations. Statistical Standards Program: Getting Started, supra note 34. To qualify,
an organization must provide a justification for access to the restricted-use
data, submit the required legal documents, agree to keep the data safe from
unauthorized disclosures at all times, and to participate fully in unannounced,
unscheduled inspections of the researcher’s office to ensure compliance with
the terms of the License and the Security Plan form.
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The 2009–10 SSOCS restricted-use dataset provides a unique
opportunity to view on a national scale the types of strict security
measures that schools employ. In the 2009–10 SSOCS, school principals
were asked to respond to several questions relating to school security.36
For example, principals were asked if, during the 2009–10 school year, it
was a practice in the principal’s school to require students to pass
through metal detectors each day, perform one or more random metal
detector checks on students, perform one or more random sweeps for
contraband (for example, drugs or weapons), control access to school
grounds during school hours, use security cameras to monitor the school,
and have any security guards or law enforcement officers present at the
principal’s school at least once a week.37 Principals responded with a
“yes” or “no” to each one of these questions.38 The dependent variables
for my study represented the likelihood that a school principal responded
affirmatively to using various combinations of strict security practices
that can create an intense surveillance environment.39
I measured student race by including the percentage of the schools’
minority student population.40 I measured student poverty by including
the percentage of students who were eligible for free or reduced-price
lunch.41 I also included other student demographic information that
Id. See also Statistical Standards Program: Applying for a Restricted-Use Data License,
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, available at http://nces.ed.gov/statprog/instruct_
apply.asp?type=rl (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) (providing guidelines for applying to
receive a restricted-use dataset license).
36.
2009–10 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 33, at 5, 8.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Nance, supra note 10, at 31. I examined four different combinations of the
strict security practices: (a) metal detectors and guards; (b) metal detectors, guards, and
random sweeps; (c) metal detectors, guards, random sweeps, and security cameras; and
(d) metal detectors, guards, random sweeps, security cameras, and locked gates. Id.
40.
Id. at 32. A school’s minority population consisted of the number of
students who were African American, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, and American
Indian/Alaskan Native. See SIMONE ROBERS ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,
INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY 2011, at 112 (2012) [hereinafter 2011
INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY], available at http://nces.ed.gov/
pubs2012/2012002rev.pdf. Racial data for the 2009–10 SSOCS came from the 2007–08
CCD school data file. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 2009–2010 SCHOOL
SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY (SSOCS): RESTRICTED-USE DATA FILE USER MANUAL 29
[hereinafter 2009–10 RESTRICTED USE MANUAL] (2011) (on file with author). Although
there was a two-year difference, it is unlikely that a school would experience a major
shift in student population over a two-year period.
41.
Nance, supra note 10, at 32. Free or reduced-price lunch is a common proxy
to measure student poverty. See, e.g., Michael Heise, Litigated Learning, Law’s Limits,
and Urban School Reform Challenges, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1419, 1441 (2007); Federal
Education Budget Project, NEW AM. FOUND., http://febp.newamerica.net/backgroundanalysis/federal-school-nutrition-programs (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (“Researchers often
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might account for whether a school decided to employ strict surveillance
methods such as the percentage of students who have limited English
proficiency, the percentage enrolled in special education, and the
percentage who scored in the bottom 15 percent on the state standardized
exam.42
Importantly, I accounted for school crime in my analysis.43 The
SSOCS asks school officials to report the number of incidents of various
types of school crime during the school year.44 Because the severity of
the school crimes may influence whether schools implement tighter
security measures,45 I categorized the crimes according to their degree of
severity. I included violent incidents;46 threats of physical attack with or
without a weapon;47 incidents involving possession of a firearm,
explosive device, knife, or other sharp object;48 incidents of distribution,
possession, or use of illegal drugs, inappropriate prescription drugs, or
alcohol;49 incidents of theft of items over $10;50 and incidents of
vandalism.51
Further, I accounted for school disorder, which also may influence a
school’s decision to implement tighter security measures.52 In addition, I
controlled for the principals’ perception of crime problems near the
school,53 the involvement of various external community groups in the
schools,54 the geographic region of the schools,55 school urbanicity,56
use free or reduced price lunch (FRPL) enrollment figures as a proxy for poverty at the
school level, because Census poverty data (which is used at the state and district level) is
not available disaggregated below the school district level and is not collected
annually.”).
42.
Nance, supra note 10, at 33. See also Aaron Kupchik & Geoff K. Ward,
Race, Poverty, and Exclusionary School Security: An Empirical Analysis of U.S.
Elementary, Middle, and High Schools, YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 10) (on file with author).
43.
Nance, supra note 10, at 33. See also Welch & Payne, supra note 27, at 27
(“One factor presumed to be closely associated with school punitiveness and disciplinary
practice is the level of school crime and disorder.”).
44.
2009–10 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 33, at 11.
45.
See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 42 (manuscript at 13–14).
46.
Violent incidents included rape or attempted rape, sexual battery other than
rape, robbery with or without a weapon, and physical attacks with or without a weapon.
2009–10 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 33, at 11.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
Nance, supra note 10, at 33–34. See also Kupchik & Ward, supra note 42
(manuscript at 10–11); Welch & Payne, supra note 27, at 27.
53.
Nance, supra note 10, at 34.
54.
Id.
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each school’s total student enrollment,57 the building level,58 and whether
the school was nontraditional like a magnet or charter school.59 Finally, I
included the school’s average percentage of students that attend school
each day.60
The empirical analysis revealed that both student race and student
poverty were strong predictors for whether a school chose to employ
high surveillance security methods. And, importantly, these findings held
true even after controlling for the other above-listed factors that might
influence the school officials’ decisions to employ strict security
measures, such as school crime, neighborhood crime, and school
disorder.61
These findings support what many scholars have observed
anecdotally—that large, urban schools serving primarily low-income or
minority students are more likely to create intense surveillance
environments than other schools.62 They suggest that schools with high
percentages of minority or low-income students tend to rely on
heavy-handed, punitive-based measures to maintain order and control
crime. They also suggest that these schools are more inclined to coerce
students into compliance and to promote safety by identifying,
apprehending, and excluding students that school officials perceive as
being dangerous, disruptive, or low-performing.63
The findings further suggest that schools serving primarily affluent
or white students find alternative ways to create safer environments.
55.
Id. at 35.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
Id. at 35–36.
61.
Other significant predictors included student enrollment (positive
predictor), schools located in the South (positive predictor), schools located in urban
areas (positive predictor), the percentage of students who had limited English proficiency
(negative predictor), and the percentage of students who received low test scores
(positive predictor). Id. at 41–42.
62.
See, e.g., Kevin P. Brady, Sharon Balmer & Deinya Phenix, School-Police
Partnership Effectiveness in Urban Schools, 39 EDUC. & URBAN SOC. 455, 456–57
(2007) (explaining that “[a]n increasing fear of school violence coupled with the public’s
misperceptions of [school safety] has caused school officials, especially those located in
urban areas, to implement more punitive-based . . . policies”); Pedro A. Noguera,
Preventing and Producing Violence: A Critical Analysis of Responses to School Violence,
65 HARV. EDUC. REV. 189, 206 (1995) (observing that most urban high schools serving
high percentages of minority students rely upon coercive or excessive forms of control to
promote school safety).
63.
See Paul Hirschfield, School Surveillance in America: Disparate and
Unequal, in SCHOOLS UNDER SURVEILLANCE 38, 45 (Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres
eds., 2010); Noguera, supra note 62, at 192.
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However, this does not mean that schools serving affluent and white
students do not rely on any security measures at all. But schools serving
primarily white and affluent students appear to be more inclined to use
less intrusive measures, such as surveillance cameras.64 As Paul
Hirschfield maintains, “criminalization in middle class schools is less
intense and more fluid than in the inner-city . . . . In short, the gated
community may be a more apt metaphor to describe the security
transformation of affluent schools, while the prison metaphor better suits
that of inner-city schools.”65 Similarly, Pedro Noguera observes: “I
frequently visit schools in suburban communities and private schools that
serve affluent students and see quite clearly that poor children in the
inner city are more likely to receive an education that places greater
emphasis on order and control than academic rigor.”66
II. CONTEXTUALIZING THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
These empirical findings showing disparities in the application of
strict security measures are disturbing and problematic on several fronts.
This Part provides the theoretical backdrop exploring why some schools
choose to rely on strict security measures, why there are disparities in the
application of strict security measures, and the societal and educational
harms that strict security measures cause—especially when applied
disproportionately to minority students.
A. The Movement towards Increased Reliance on Strict Security
Measures
Why some schools choose to rely on intense surveillance methods
while others do not is a complex question. The current state of affairs is
due, at least in part, to several highly publicized acts of school violence,
as well as several federal, state, and local laws, policies, and practices.
64.
See 2011 INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY, supra note 40, at
164–65 (disaggregating the use of security measures by student race and socio-economic
status). In fact, recent data from the U.S. Department of Education indicate that schools
serving high percentages of white or affluent students tend to rely more on drug-sniffing
dogs than other schools. See id. at 165; see also Kupchik & Ward, supra note 42,
(manuscript at 12) (indicating that high schools with lower percentages of racial
minorities were more likely to use drug-sniffing dogs than other schools). Nevertheless,
as the empirical analysis summarized here suggests, schools serving higher percentages
of minority students are more likely to use several different surveillance methods in
conjunction that create a more intense surveillance environment than other schools. Id.
65.
Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison?: The Criminalization of School
Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79, 84 (2008).
66.
See Pedro A. Noguera, Schools, Prisons, and Social Implications of
Punishment: Rethinking Disciplinary Practices, 42 THEORY INTO PRAC. 341, 348 (2003).
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Unfortunately, many of these laws, policies, and practices also have
contributed to the disparate application of strict security measures on
minority and low-income students.
1. A RESPONSE TO HIGHLY PUBLICIZED ACTS OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE
Even though schools remain among the safest places for children,67
one cannot discount the role that fear plays in a school official’s decision
to adopt strict security practices.68 In the wake of several highly
publicized incidents of school violence, it is no surprise that school
officials and policymakers have resorted to strict security measures to
demonstrate to the public that they are implementing measures to reduce

67.
See, e.g., BARBARA FEDDERS, JASON LANGBERG & JENNIFER STORY, SCHOOL
SAFETY IN NORTH CAROLINA: REALITIES, RECOMMENDATIONS & RESOURCES 4 (2013),
available
at
http://www.legalaidnc.org/public/learn/media_releases/2013_
MediaReleases/school-safety-in-north-carolina.pdf (“School violence that results in death
is extremely rare. Young people are much more likely to be harmed in the home or on the
street than they are in schools.”) (citations omitted); Randall R. Beger, The “Worst of
Both Worlds”: School Security and the Disappearing Fourth Amendment Rights of
Students, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 336, 338 (2003) (“Contrary to popular belief, schools
remain among the safest places for children.”); Randy Borum et al., What Can Be Done
about School Shootings? A Review of the Evidence, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 27, 27 (2010)
(explaining that the number of homicides that occur on school grounds represents less
than 1 percent of the annual homicides of children age 5 to 18, and that “any given school
can expect to experience a student homicide about once every 6,000 years” (citation
omitted)); Nance, supra note 10, at 17; Noguera, supra note 66, at 343 (“Despite surveys
that suggest a growing number of teachers and students fear violence in school, schools
in the United States are generally safe places.” (citation omitted)); Arne Duncan,
Resources for Schools to Prepare for and Recover from Crisis, HOMEROOM: U.S. DEP’T
OF EDUC. BLOG (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.ed.gov/blog/2012/12/resources-for-schoolsto-prepare-for-and-recover-from-crisis/ (“Schools are among the safest places for
children and adolescents in our country, and, in fact, crime in schools has been trending
downward for more than a decade.”).
68.
AARON KUPCHIK, HOMEROOM SECURITY: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN AN AGE OF
FEAR 3 (2010) (explaining that fears and insecurities are powerful motivators to increase
security measures in response to high-profile incidents of school violence); Beger, supra
note 67, at 338 (“Widely publicized incidents of juvenile violence in public schools have
created the public misconception that such behavior is commonplace.”); Borum et al.,
supra note 67, at 27 (“[S]chool shootings receive such intense publicity, and are such
inherently disturbing events, that they generate an inflated perception of danger.”);
Hirschfield, supra note 63, at 38 (“The importation of surveillance tactics from criminal
justice and the military into schools is most commonly attributed to elevated fears of
school violence and a growing realization that ‘it can happen here.’”); Matthew J. Mayer
& Peter E. Leone, School Violence and Disruption Revisited: Equity and Safety in the
School House, 40 FOCUS ON EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 1, 6 (2007) (“[M]edia coverage of
school violence has shaped the public’s beliefs, and in many cases has led to a distorted
perception of violence in schools, as well as adolescent violence more generally.”).
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school crime, maintain order, and protect children.69 As Torin Monahan
and Rodolfo Torres observe, “the threat of ‘another Columbine’ (or
Virginia Tech, and so on) haunts the social imagery, leading parents,
policy makers, and others to the sober conclusion that any security
measure is worth whatever trade-offs are involved in order to ensure
safety.”70 Indeed, since the Newtown shootings, several lawmakers and
school officials have responded by enacting policies that include the use
of intense surveillance methods to monitor not only campus visitors but
their own students as well.71

69.
Brady, Balmer & Phenix, supra note 62, at 456 (“An increasing fear of
school violence coupled with the public’s misperceptions of the actual degree of violence
in our nation’s schools has caused school officials, especially those located in urban
areas, to implement more punitive-based school discipline policies and practices for
responding to and preventing student crime and violence.”); see Welch & Payne, supra
note 27, at 26.
70.
Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres, Introduction, in SCHOOLS UNDER
SURVEILLANCE, supra note 63, at 1, 2–3. Elizabeth Scott has described this general social
phenomena as the “moral panic problem.” See Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and
the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime Regulation, 31 L. & INEQUALITY 535, 541 (2013)
(describing that although school shootings are rare events, after the Columbine shootings
“legislatures across the country rushed to pass strict zero tolerance laws, making it a
crime to threaten violence in school”).
71.
See, e.g., S.B. 2267, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (proposing
funding to equip schools with “alarms, cameras, electronic door locks, emergency
response call buttons, intercom systems, key or pass cards, [and] metal detectors”); S.B.
2230, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013) (funding security aid to provide schools with
metal detectors, electronically operated partitions, and security cameras); H. 2343, 2013
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013) (providing funding to schools for purchasing
security equipment); H.B. 612, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2013) (proposing funding to
school districts for “surveillance cameras, metal detectors, and other safety equipment”).
See also Tom Barton, Board Members Unsure Metal Detectors Needed at Beaufort
County Schools, ISLAND PACKET (May 8, 2013), http://www.islandpacket.com/2013/
05/08/2495164/board-members-unsure-metal-detectors.html (discussing a South Carolina
school board’s consideration of adding metal detectors in schools); Doug Finke, State
Board of Education Calls for $874M Increase in School Funding, J. STAR (Jan. 25, 2013,
12:01 AM), http://www.pjstar.com/news/x1503807290/State-Board-of-Education-callsfor-874M-increase-in-school-funding (“The Illinois State Board of Education called for
an $874 million increase in state spending on elementary and secondary education on
Thursday, including $20 million that would be available for school security measures.”);
Liz Hayes, Burrell Board Focuses on School Safety, TRIBLIVE (May 7, 2013, 12:51 AM),
http://triblive.com/neighborhoods/yourallekiskivalley/yourallekiskivalleymore/397029474/burrell-security-wagner#axzz2THQXVCDR (discussing a Pennsylvania school
district that is considering using metal detectors more regularly, installing X-ray
equipment to screen student backpacks, and making windows “more bulletproof”); Mary
Wilson, Pa. Senate Leader Suggests Steep Increase in School Security Funding,
NEWSWORKS (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/item/49955-pasenate-leader-suggests-steep-increase-in-school-security-funding?linktype=hp_
topstorylist (“The leader of Pennsylvania’s Senate wants to increase grant funding
twentyfold for school security, including armed guards.”).
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Nevertheless, while fear of an extreme incident most likely explains
some of the impetus behind more schools adopting strict security
measures, it fails to fully explain this recent trend for at least two
reasons. First, as scholar Paul Hirschfield points out, fear does not
explain why schools have maintained or intensified their security efforts
long after the public panic over highly publicized violent incidents has
subsided.72 Second, fear does not fully explain why some schools adopt
harsher, stricter security measures than other schools if, as the school
shootings demonstrate, an extreme incident can occur in any type of
school, including a school in a white suburban neighborhood.
2. THE SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY LAWS
Some school officials may adopt strict security measures as part of
an overall effort to push low-performing students out of their schools.
Federal and state school accountability laws require school officials to
test students each year and impose severe consequences for schools that
do not meet certain standards. For instance, under the No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA),73 all schools that receive federal funds
are required to test students at various stages during grades three through
twelve in reading, language arts, math, and science.74 Under the NCLBA,
schools must demonstrate improvement in student test scores across all
student sub-groups to avoid receiving a negative label, being placed on
probation, or eventually being taken over by the state.75 To avoid these
sanctions, many scholars are concerned that school officials may push
low-performing students out of their schools by suspending, expelling, or
referring low-performing students to the juvenile justice system.76 James
72.
See Hirschfield, supra note 65, at 85; Welch & Payne, supra note 27, at
26–27.
73.
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)
74.
See Testing: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. at
http://www2.ed.gov/nclb/accountability/ayp/testing-faq.html (last modified on Nov. 17,
2014). See also Monahan & Torres, supra note 70, at 5.
75.
Monahan & Torres, supra note 70, at 5.
76.
See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT: HOW
“ZERO TOLERANCE” AND HIGH-STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE
SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 28–33 (2010), available at http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/
d05cb2181a4545db07_r2im6caqe.pdf; KUPCHIK, supra note 68, at 28 (discussing that the
NCLBA puts pressure on schools to push out low performing students); Linda
Darling-Hammond, Race, Inequality and Educational Accountability: The Irony of ‘No
Child Left Behind’, 10 RACE, ETHNICITY & EDUC. 245, 252–55 (2007); Deborah Gordon
Klehr, Addressing the Unintended Consequences of No Child Left Behind and Zero
Tolerance: Better Strategies for Safe Schools and Successful Students, 16 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 585, 602–03 (2009); James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the
No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 969–70 (2004); see also Jason P.
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Ryan observes, “the temptation to exclude low-performing students,
enhanced by the NCLBA, can hardly be denied: One less student
performing below the proficiency level increases the overall percentage
of students who have hit that benchmark.”77 Empirical evidence provides
support for these theories. For example, one study of Texas’s educational
accountability program, which became a model for the NCLBA, found
that test scores were boosted in part by finding ways to keep students out
of the testing count and excluding thousands of other students from
school.78 Empirical studies examining accountability programs in other
states find similar results.79
The incentive that the NCLBA creates to push low-performing
students out is bolstered by the fact that the NCLBA does not have the
same accountability standards for graduation rates.80 Data on graduation
rates since the NCLBA was passed in 2002 are telling. Focusing on only
the one hundred largest school districts in the United States, which serve
about 40 percent of the nation’s African-American, Latino, and Native
American students, graduation rates have plummeted since 2002.81
Specifically, from 2002 to 2006, seventy-three of those school districts
reported decreases in graduation rates, and seventeen of those districts
reported decreases greater than 10 percent.82 Further, since the NCLBA
was passed, the overall graduation rates of these districts are low. In
2006, only ten of those one hundred districts graduated 80 percent of
their students; sixty-seven of them had a graduation rate of 66 percent or
lower; and in twenty-five of those districts, less than half of their
students graduated.83
3. THE DECLINE OF STUDENTS’ FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Over the last few decades, students’ Fourth Amendment rights have
steadily declined as courts have provided school officials with

Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches of Students’ Belongings: A Legal, Empirical,
and Normative Analysis, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 367, 397 (2013).
77.
Ryan, supra note 76, at 969; see also Darling-Hammond, supra note 76, at
252 (“Perhaps the most adverse, unintended consequence of NCLB’s accountability
strategy is that it undermines safety nets for struggling students rather than expanding
them. The accountability provisions of the Act actually create large incentives for schools
that can to keep such students out and to hold back or push out students who are not
doing well.”).
78.
Darling-Hammond, supra note 76, at 253.
79.
Id. at 252–55.
80.
Ryan, supra note 76, at 970.
81.
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 76, at 30.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
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constitutional leeway to maintain order and discipline within schools.84
This movement in the law has made it easier for school officials to rely
on intense surveillance measures in their schools without fear of legal
challenges. To conduct a search, school officials are not required to
obtain a warrant, show probable cause, or have an individualized
suspicion that a student participated in wrongdoing.85 As a result, school
officials are permitted to invoke a host of suspicionless search practices
in schools. For example, courts routinely uphold the use of metal
detectors86 and random searches through lockers,87 and—if this issue
were presented to a court—most likely would uphold the use of
surveillance cameras in the hallways and public rooms through the
school.88 Further, no law prohibits school officials from using these strict
security measures in combination even when their cumulative use creates
an intense environment that may not be conducive to a healthy learning
climate.89
4. FEDERAL AND STATE POLICIES SUPPORT A PUNITIVE APPROACH
Finally, the increase of strict security measures may be due, at least
in part, to broad government support for “tough on crime” policies.
Under a theory developed by scholar Jonathon Simon, federal and state
governments have played a centralized role in education that once
84.
See infra Nance, supra note 10, at 7–12; Part III; see also Nance, supra note
76, at 376, 391–94; James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1335, 1415 (2000) (stating that “the Court’s decisions regarding student searches
rest on the value-laden view that maintaining discipline is necessary to preserve the
educational process of schools”).
85.
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653–54 (1995); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985).
86.
See, e.g., Hough v. Shakopee Pub. Sch., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104 (D.
Minn. 2009); In re Latasha W., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 886–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); State
v. J.A., 679 So. 2d 316, 319–20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); In re F.B., 726 A.2d 361, 366
(Pa. 1999).
87.
See, e.g., State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 150 (Iowa 2003); In re Patrick
Y., 746 A.2d 405, 414–15 (Md. 2000); In re Isiah B., 176 Wis. 2d 639, 500 N.W.2d 637,
641 (1993). However, there is a substantial disagreement among courts regarding
whether students possess an expectation of privacy in their lockers. See KIM ET AL., supra
note 17, 115–16; Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s Unanswered (Misanswered)
Fourth Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847,
933–37 (2011); Nance, supra note 76, at 411–12 and accompanying notes.
88.
See, e.g., United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991)
(“Videotaping of suspects in public places, such as banks, does not violate the [F]ourth
[A]mendment . . . .”). However, courts do not permit surreptitious video surveillance in
certain locations such as student lockers rooms or bathrooms. See Brannum v. Overton
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 499 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that surreptitious video
surveillance of a student locker room violates the Fourth Amendment).
89.
See infra Part III.B.2.
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belonged to local governments and have recast disruptive students as
criminals who must be reformed through punitive measures.90
Zero-tolerance policies are a good example of this mindset.91 Under the
Federal Gun-Free Schools Act, states receiving federal education funds
are required to have a state law that compels schools to expel students for
at least one year for bringing a firearm to school.92 Although this law
recently has softened somewhat by permitting superintendents to modify
the expulsion requirement on a case-by-case basis,93 many states and
schools have adopted laws and policies modeled after the Federal
Gun-Free Schools Act by creating strict rules that impose predetermined
consequences for certain acts, irrespective of the surrounding
circumstances or intent of the students.94 These zero-tolerance policies
have pushed more students out of schools and have increased referrals to
the juvenile justice system.95

90.
See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 215–16,
218–21 (2007); Hirschfield, supra note 65, at 87. But see Welch & Payne, supra note 27,
at 27 (suggesting that the “‘governing through crime’ orientation . . . does not address the
changing nature of discipline that is not a result of federal or state initiatives because
much discipline continues to originate with individual teachers and principals”).
91.
So-called “zero-tolerance policies” refer to policies that require school
officials to issue severe punishments, such as suspension or expulsion, for both serious
and minor infractions. See Russell J. Skiba & M. Karega Rausch, Zero Tolerance,
Suspension, and Expulsion: Questions of Equity and Effectiveness, in HANDBOOK OF
CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 1063,
1063 (Carolyn M. Evertson & Carol S. Weinstein eds., 2006).
92.
See 20 U.S.C. § 7151(b)(1) (2012).
93.
See id. See also Federal Law on Guns in Schools, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT
GUN VIOLENCE (May 21, 2012), http://smartgunlaws.org/federal-law-on-guns-in-schools/.
94.
See Klehr, supra note 76, at 589.
95.
Id. at 590. Barry Feld explains that schools that adopt zero-tolerance
policies towards trivial violations adopt the “broken window” theory that failure to
address minor infractions will lead to more serious disruption. See Feld, supra note 87, at
886–87. As a result, schools often suspend, expel, or refer students to the juvenile justice
system for minor infractions such as disorderly conduct, cursing, fighting, or bringing
nail clippers, pocket knives, scissors, or plastic knives to campus. See id. Scholars and
policymakers have strongly criticized zero tolerance policies, demonstrating that they are
ineffective and counterproductive. See, e.g., Am. Psychol. Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task
Force, Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in Schools? An Evidentiary Review and
Recommendations, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 852, 859–60 (2008). Very recently, the U.S.
Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights issued a resource guide for improving
school climate and discipline, suggesting that schools employ a tiered approach to
discipline and reminding schools that the Federal Gun-Free Schools Act “does not require
that states or schools implement wide-ranging zero-tolerance policies or rely on
exclusionary discipline” for acts that do not involve firearms. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
GUIDING PRINCIPLES: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR IMPROVING SCHOOL CLIMATE AND
DISCIPLINE 15 (2014) [hereinafter GUIDING PRINCIPLES], available at
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/guiding-principles.pdf.
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Additional evidence of government support for a punitive approach
to educating children includes programs that have provided schools with
millions of dollars for strict security measures. For example, the U.S.
Department of Justice’s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)
initiatives allowed schools to request up to $500,000 to support half the
cost of their security programs.96 Schools used this money to purchase
metal detectors, locks, lighting, to hire security and law enforcement
officers, and to fund other deterrent measures.97 Since 1995, COPS has
provided schools with approximately $913 million for security
measures.98 In another federal program, created by the Safe and
Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act,99 Congress authorized money
for schools to acquire metal detectors, electronic locks, surveillance
cameras, or other related equipment and technologies.100 Further, several
states have programs that provide money to schools for strict security
measures,101 and the Newtown tragedy has prompted other state
96.
See OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
2011 SECURE OUR SCHOOLS PROGRAM 1 (2011), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/
pdf/2011AwardDocs/CSPP-SOS-CHP/SOSMethodology.pdf.
97.
Id.
98.
See OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FACT
SHEET:
SECURE
OUR
SCHOOLS
(Sept.
2011),
available
at
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2011AwardDocs/CSPP-SOS-CHP/2011-SOS-PostFactSheet.pdf.
99.
20 U.S.C. §§ 7101–65 (2006).
100. 20 U.S.C. § 7115(b)(2)(E)(ii) (2006). Notably, the grant application
procedures make clear that the Department of Education views school security equipment
as only one component of an overall strategy designed to create a safe and healthy
learning environment. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. ET AL., SAFE SCHOOLS/HEALTHY
STUDENTS: INFORMATION AND APPLICATION PROCEDURES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 22
(2009), available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/dvpsafeschools/2009-184l.pdf. In the
2009 application, no more than 10 percent of the grant could be used to fund security
equipment. Id. The remainder of the grant must be used for programs designed to address
student safety and health holistically by providing behavioral, social, and emotional
support; mental health services; early childhood social and emotional learning programs;
and alcohol, tobacco, and other drug prevention activities for students, their families, and
the community. Id. at 22–24.
101. See ALA. CODE § 41-15B-2.2(b)(2)(b.1.)(2) (2013) (“School Safety
Enhancement Programs eligible for grants shall be designed to prevent or reduce violence
in the schools . . . . The programs shall relate to one or more of the following: . . . (v)
Safety plans involving the use of metal detectors, other security devices, uniforms, school
safety resource officers, or other personnel employed to provide a safe school
environment.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1185(b) (2012) (“A public school may request
funding assistance from the state for the installation of safety equipment including, but
not limited to, video surveillance cameras, metal detectors, and other similar security
devices.”); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302-A(c)(9) (2013) (“[T]he office is
authorized to make targeted grants to school entities to fund programs which address
school violence, including . . . metal detectors, protective lighting, surveillance
equipment . . . and training in the use of security-related technology.”); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 59-66-30 (2013) (“Using funds appropriated by the General Assembly, each public
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legislatures to pass or consider passing legislation that will provide
additional funding to schools for school security.102 These federal and
state initiatives often are promoted by powerful networks of criminal
justice professionals who serve as law enforcement officers, private
security officers, school security consultants, and vendors of school
security equipment.103 Lamentably, these funds could be better used to
support alternative, more effective programs that reduce school crime
and do not harm the learning environment.104
B. Why Disparities Exist
The empirical evidence indicates that minority and low-income
students are disproportionately subjected to strict security measures.105
No doubt, some of the policies described above contribute to these
disparities, such as the political appeal of a “tough on crime” approach in
inner-city schools, money from state and federal governments for strict
security measures, and school accountability policies that motivate
school officials to push low-performing students out of schools.
Pedro Noguera, a scholar who has studied the plight of inner-city
schools and youth for decades, offers further insight into why schools
serving disadvantaged students tend to adopt strict security measures. He
observes that schools traditionally carry out three important roles: (1) to
sort children according to their abilities and aptitudes and place them on
paths that will affect their future occupations and societal roles as adults;
(2) to socialize children by teaching them norms and values that are
central to our society and social order; and (3) to provide a custodial
function by protecting and caring for children while they are away from
their parents.106 According to Noguera, schools cannot accomplish the
middle, junior high, and high school in the State must be equipped with one hand-held
metal detector.”).
102. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
103. See Paul J. Hirschfield & Katarzyna Celinska, Beyond Fear: Sociological
Perspectives on the Criminalization of School Discipline, 5 SOC. COMPASS 1, 6 (2011).
104. See Nance, supra note 10, at 48–56. See also Hirschfield & Celinska, supra
note 103, at 6. Indeed, as Paul Hirschfield and Katarzyna Celinska point out, the billions
of tax dollars spent on mass incarceration deprives schools of needed funds to hire more
qualified teachers, better counselors and mental health services, and alternative means to
improve student behavior. Id.
105. See supra Part I.
106. Noguera, supra note 66, at 344. As one might imagine, exactly what role
public schools do and should play has been the subject of much debate. See, e.g., Betsy
Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict between Authority and Individual
Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1649 (1986) (“The mission of schools as
transmitters of social, moral, and political values makes it inevitable that disputes will
arise over which values are to be inculcated and who is authorized to make these
decisions. There is no consensus, for example, on whether schools should emphasize a
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first two functions without maintaining order and control.107 However,
while sorting children according to their presumed aptitudes and abilities,
children soon learn where they stand and develop certain expectations
about their future occupations and societal roles.108 They begin to
comprehend that some of them will reap the benefits of an education and
some will not. Those students who will benefit will acquire useful
knowledge and skills, become admitted to college, have access to
well-paying jobs, and assume leadership roles in private and public
institutions.109 Students also understand that some of them will achieve at
least minimum economic security.110 But students also understand that
still others will not be admitted to college and will end up with dead-end
jobs, struggle to meet basic needs with a poverty-level income their
entire lives, and become subordinated.111 Students that comprehend that
the educational process is not working for them—that they most likely
will not enter college or have a promising career—have very few
incentives to comply with school rules.112 Those students often cause the
most trouble in schools.113 They misbehave out of frustration or
embarrassment because they are behind academically and are not able to
meet grade-level expectations.114 They recoil from the traditional
educational system; challenge the mandatory attendance policies; disrupt
classroom activities; and find other illegitimate ways to establish their

common language, history, and culture promoting assimilationist and national norms, or
emphasize pluralism and diversity.”). For an interesting discussion of two competing
missions of schools, see Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional
Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 64–69 (1996)
(describing two different philosophies for the mission of public schools: (1) “social
reconstruction,” where the school “is an institution where power is necessary only to
facilitate the child in his attempts to reconstruct a new social order” and (2) “social
reproduction,” where the school’s mission is to “proclaim the child’s place in society by
inculcating society’s traditions and habits”).
107. Noguera, supra note 66, at 344; see also Levin, supra note 106, at 1648–49.
108. Noguera, supra note 66, at 344.
109. Id. at 343.
110. Id. at 344.
111. Id.
112. Id. See also MATTHEW P. STEINBERG ET AL., STUDENT AND TEACHER SAFETY
IN CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE ROLES OF COMMUNITY CONTEXT AND SCHOOL SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION 27–31 (2011), available at http://ccsr.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/
publications/SAFETY%20IN%20CPS.pdf (finding that the academic skills of the
students are strongly related to school safety); PAUL WILLIS, LEARNING TO LABOR: HOW
WORKING CLASS KIDS GET WORKING CLASS JOBS 72 (1977) (arguing that for students
who believe that knowledge and credentials acquired in schools are irrelevant, “the
teachers’ authority becomes increasingly the random one of the prison guard, not the
necessary one of the pedagogue”).
113. Noguera, supra note 66, at 343–44.
114. Id. at 342.
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self-worth, identity, and status among their peers.115 Further, students
who suffer from abusive home environments, have language barriers,
have health problems, are neglected, frequently move from school to
school, or are harassed or bullied by other students also tend to
misbehave and be disruptive.116 Noguera argues that ultimately, then, it is
the dire “needs of students and the inability of the schools to meet those
needs” that causes students to be disruptive and dangerous at school.117
School officials generally understand that students on dead-end
educational paths or those who have the greatest needs typically tend to
be more disruptive at school.118 However, rather than focusing on
meeting students’ challenging needs; finding ways to keep students
focused on learning or being intellectually engaged; preventing students
from becoming restless, bored, or falling behind academically; inspiring
them to understand that the educational system can and will work for
them; or providing appropriate levels of nurturing and kindness, schools
too often become fixated on maintaining order and discipline—
particularly because of the recent, highly publicized incidents of school

115. See STEINBERG, ET AL., supra note 112, at 46 (observing that low-achieving
students are less likely to be engaged in school, more likely to be frustrated by their
performance, more likely to misbehave, and less likely to respond appropriately to
punishment).
116. See Noguera, supra note 66, at 342.
117. Id. Of course, these dire needs also underscore the reasons why schools that
serve high concentrations of students who live in poverty and in unstable environments
require more resources to properly educate. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE,
RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION 29–30 (2006),
available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED500822.pdf. However, schools serving
disadvantaged students most often have fewer resources to serve students with greater
needs. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 17, at 27–65 (reporting that disadvantaged
students often receive unequal access to qualified teachers, lack access to high quality
curriculum, and are subject to dysfunctional learning environments); Osamudia R. James,
White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on White Identity
Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (maintaining that majority-minority
schools often have limited access to adequate resources), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2235771; Roslyn Arlin Mickelson,
The Academic Consequences of Desegregation and Segregation: Evidence from the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1513, 1547 (2003) (finding that
segregated black learning environments offer fewer resources to educate students); Gary
Orfield, The Growth of Segregation: African-Americans, Latinos, and Unequal
Education, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION 53, 67–69 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton, eds. 1996) (observing that
low-income and minority students typically have less qualified teachers and fewer
instructional resources and lamenting that “disadvantaged students face more barriers and
receive less reinforcement to succeed in school”).
118. Noguera, supra note 66, at 344.
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violence.119 Thus, schools serving large numbers of academically
unsuccessful students, many of whom attend inner-city schools and are
low-income or minority students, often use extreme forms of discipline,
punishment, and control that include relying on strict security
measures.120 Noguera observes:
Such schools often operate more like prisons than schools.
They are more likely to rely on guards, metal detectors, and
surveillance cameras to monitor and control students, restrict
access to bathrooms, and attempt to regiment behavior by
adopting an assortment of rules and restrictions. . . . In any
educational setting where children are regarded as
academically deficient, and where the adults view large
numbers of them as potentially bad or even dangerous, the
fixation on control tends to override all other educational
objectives and concerns.121
The empirical findings discussed here provide support for
Noguera’s theory. They indicate that large, urban schools serving large
percentages of historically disadvantaged student populations are more
likely to create intense surveillance environments than other schools.122
C. Educational and Social Harms
Instead of relying on strict security measures, many educational and
sociological considerations suggest that schools should adopt alternative
methods to reduce violence and school crime. One very important
consideration is that the use of strict security measures in schools
contributes significantly to the school-to-prison pipeline, which
disproportionally affects students of color. The school-to-prison pipeline
is a phenomenon that has been extensively discussed and criticized in the
literature.123 It refers to the practice of funneling students directly into the
juvenile justice system or suspending or expelling students, thereby
creating conditions under which students are more likely to be arrested

119. Id. at 342, 345, 348. Again, this highlights the point that educators serving
disadvantaged students require more resources than they currently have to help them
address students’ acute needs in more productive ways.
120. Id. at 345.
121. Id.
122. See supra Part I.
123. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 87, at 884–95; Kim, supra note 9; Lisa Thurau &
Joanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law Enforcement Meets Discipline in Public
Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977 (2010).
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and sent to prison.124 When strict security measures are used in
conjunction with zero-tolerance policies, students discovered carrying
contraband automatically are suspended, expelled, or arrested—
regardless of students’ motives.125 The result is that too many students
spend more time out of school or are funneled into the juvenile justice
system, neither of which is in those students’ best interests.126 Spending
more time away from school causes students to fall behind academically,
stigmatizes the suspended or expelled students, and precludes access to
school resources that might address those students’ needs.127
Unfortunately, such consequences may cause the students to continue
their disruptive behavior because they become frustrated, embarrassed,
or simply give up on the education system.128 The long-term
consequences of exclusionary discipline practices are devastating to
students. Several empirical studies show a correlation between
exclusionary discipline policies and “school avoidance, diminished
educational engagement, decreased academic achievement, increased
behavioral problems, increased likelihood of dropping out, substance
abuse, and involvement with juvenile justice systems.”129
Law enforcement referrals and arrests can be even more detrimental
to students’ futures. Catherine Kim, Daniel Losen, and Damon Hewitt
report that an arrest of a student “nearly doubles the odds of dropping out
of school and, if coupled with a court appearance, nearly quadruples the
odds of dropout; lowers standardized-test scores; reduces future
employment prospects; and increases the likelihood of future interaction
with the criminal justice system.”130 They further report that student
arrests can have a significant negative impact on other students and on
the larger community. They continue:
Classmates who witness a child being arrested for a minor
infraction may develop negative views or distrust of law
enforcement. Juvenile-court dockets and detention centers
become crowded with cases that could be handled more
efficiently and more effectively by school principals. And the
community pays the costs associated with an increase in

124. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 12, at 2.
125. See supra Part II.A.4.
126. KIM ET AL., supra note 17, at 112–13. See also DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER,
supra note 30, at 4.
127. Noguera, supra note 66, at 345–46. See also DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER,
supra note 30, at 4.
128. Noguera, supra note 66, at 342, 345–46.
129. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 30, at 4–5.
130. KIM ET AL, supra note 17, at 113.
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dropouts, crime, and unemployment, and, in extreme cases, the
incarceration of children.131

Apart from contributing to the school-to-prison pipeline, strict
security measures may be harmful in and of themselves because they
may contribute to poor learning climates. Most educators understand that
trust is a fundamental component to the teaching and learning process.132
Indeed, students learn best when they are treated with kindness and
respect, have positive self-esteems, and have positive relationships with
their classmates and their teachers.133 Educational scholar Linda
Darling-Hammond observes that successful schools, especially in
challenging environments, have “strong teaching faculties who work in
organizational structures that create more coherence and a ‘communal’
orientation, in which staff see themselves as part of a family and work
together to create a caring environment.”134 Yet many scholars argue that
strict security measures undermine trust and send a negative signal to
students—that they are dangerous and prone to commit illegal, violent
acts.135 This message, scholars fear, may sour students’ attitudes towards
school and school officials.136 Martin Gardner explained the problem in
the following way:

131. Id.
132. See David Domenici & James Forman Jr., What It Takes to Transform a
School inside a Juvenile Justice Facility: The Story of the Maya Angelou Academy, in
JUSTICE FOR KIDS, supra note 17, at 283, 289 (“High achieving schools are places where a
culture of trust dominates.”); Roger D. Goddard, Megan Tschannen-Moran & Wayne K.
Hoy, A Multilevel Examination of the Distribution and Effects of Teacher Trust in
Students and Parents in Urban Elementary Schools, 102 ELEM. SCH. J. 3, 3–4 (2001)
(observing that trust is an important element of the learning process); Megan
Tschannen-Moran & Wayne K. Hoy, A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the Nature,
Meaning, and Measurement of Trust, 70 REV. EDUC. RES. 547, 547 (2000).
133. See Donna Lieberman, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, Testimony before the
New York City Council Committee on Education and Public Safety Regarding the
Impact of Over-Policing in Schools on Students’ Education and Privacy Rights, (June 14,
2006), available at http://www.nyclu.org/content/over-policing-schools-studentseducation-and-privacy-rights (last visited Jan. 28, 2013).
134. DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 17, at 65.
135. See, e.g., Beger, supra note 67, at 340; Noguera, supra note 62, at 190–91.
136. See Martin R. Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal
for an Individualized Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in the
Schools, 22 GA. L. REV. 897, 943 (1988); Hirschfield, supra note 63, at 46 (explaining
that strict security measures produce barriers between students and their schools and are
“a frequent cause of disunity or discord within the school community”); Jen Weiss, Scan
This: Examining Student Resistance to School Surveillance, in SCHOOLS UNDER
SURVEILLANCE, supra note 63, at 213, 227–28 (concluding after a qualitative study that
strict security measures caused students to distrust school authorities).
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In a very real sense, each and every student stands accused, has
become a “suspect” in generalized school searches, especially
given the special relationship of trust which supposedly exists
between student and teacher. Surely a student even indirectly
accused by his teacher as a possible thief or drug user suffers a
greater indignity and loss of self-esteem by being subjected to a
generalized search than does an airline passenger passing
through a metal detector or a driver [through] a checkpoint. Far
from “morally neutral,” school searches are instead particularly
rife with moral overtones.137
Along similar lines, Donna Liebermann, Executive Director of the
New York Civil Liberties Union, testified that strict security measures do
not contribute to environments that are conducive to educational and
social growth.138 Rather, they “foster environments where children
perceive that they are being treated as criminals; where they are
diminished by such perceptions; and where they, consequentially,
cultivate negative attitudes toward their schools.”139 Another teacher
summed up her experience with strict security measures as follows: “The
medium is the message. And the message that [strict security measures]
give[] out is that we are afraid of our students.”140
Indeed, scholar Tom Tyler has studied and written extensively about
the social costs in communities subject to high surveillance and the threat
of government punishment. Tyler believes that intense surveillance
environments harm the social climate because their use implies distrust,
decreasing people’s ability to feel positively about themselves and the
organizations to which they belong.141 Further, Tyler observes that
individuals subject to intense surveillance climates may also perceive
such intrusions as unfair, causing them to become angry and less willing

137. Gardner, supra note 136, at 943. In addition, it should be emphasized that
students are required to submit to searches against their will because they are subject to
mandatory school attendance policies. Airline passengers, on the other hand, decide
voluntarily to board a plane.
138. See Lieberman, supra note 133.
139. Id.
140. Carol Ascher, Gaining Control of Violence in the Schools: A View from the
Field, 100 ERIC DIGEST 4 (1994), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/
ED377256.pdf.
141. See Tom R. Tyler & Lindsay E. Rankin, Legal Socialization and
Delinquency, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 353,
361 (Barry C. Feld & Donna M. Bishop eds., 2012); see also David Kipnis, Trust &
Technology, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY & RESEARCH 39, 46–47
(Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler, eds. 1996).
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to comply with the law.142 Thus, regardless of whether intense
surveillance works in the short term, its use introduces other unintended
social costs such as distrust and paranoia, which have a deleterious effect
on individuals’ willingness to cooperate and participate in the system in
the long term.143
Apart from their negative effect on the learning climate, there are
serious questions regarding whether strict security measures actually
promote school safety or only provide a false sense of security.144 For
example, Abigail Hankin, Marci Hertz, and Thomas Simon recently
conducted an extensive review of the literature regarding the impact of
metal detector use in schools.145 They determined that there was
“insufficient evidence to draw a conclusion about the potential beneficial
effect of metal detector use on student and staff behavior or
perceptions.”146 They further acknowledged that much of the research
shows that the use of metal detectors correlates with “lower levels of
students’ perceptions of security in school and higher levels of school
disorder.”147 Interestingly, many scholars maintain that strict security
142. See Tyler & Rankin, supra note 141, at 361; Jason Sunshine & Tom Tyler,
The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing,
37 L. & SOC. REV. 513, 514 (2003).
143. See Tyler & Rankin, supra note 141, at 361–62.
144. See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE
SCHOOLHOUSE
TO
JAILHOUSE
TRACK
8
(2005),
available
at
http://www.advancementproject.org/sites/default/files/publications/FINALEOLrep.pdf
(arguing that strict security measures may “produce a perception of safety, [but] there is
little or no evidence that they create safer learning environments or change disruptive
behaviors”); Ascher, supra note 140, at 4 (“Rather than offering reassurance, metal
detectors and other mechanical devices, as well as security forces, are seen as providing a
false sense of safety, if not a harsh symbol of the failure to create safe schools.”); Richard
E. Redding & Sarah M. Shalf, The Legal Context of School Violence: The Effectiveness
of Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Efforts to Reduce Gun Violence in
Schools, 23 LAW & POL’Y 297, 319 (2001) (“It is hard to find anything better than
anecdotal evidence” to demonstrate that strict security measures such as metal detectors
and guards reduce violence in schools.). Research on the effectiveness of school security
measures is extremely limited, especially causal research demonstrating the effects of
strict security measures. See Mayer & Leone, supra note 68, at 12.
145. Abigail Hankin, Marci Hertz & Thomas Simon, Impacts of Metal Detector
Use in Schools: Insights from 15 Years of Research, 81 J. SCH. HEALTH 100, 105 (2011).
146. Id.
147. Id. See also John Blosnich & Robert Bossarte, Low-Level Violence in
Schools: Is There an Association between School Safety Measures and Peer
Victimization?, 81 J. SCH. HEALTH 107, 107, 111–12 (2011) (finding that school security
measures did not reduce violent behaviors related to bullying); Matthew J. Mayer & Peter
Leone, A Structural Analysis of School Violence and Disruption: Implications for
Creating Safer Schools, 22 EDUC. & TREATMENT OF CHILD. 333, 349–52 (1999)
(concluding that student victimization and school disorder were higher in schools using
strict security measures). But see Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Violence-Related Attitudes and Behaviors of High School Students—New York City,
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measures may actually hamper school officials’ efforts to promote safe
environments because their use may engender mistrust and alienate
students, leading to more disorder in schools.148
Furthermore, one must not forget that strict security measures
cannot and will not prevent serious acts of violence from occurring on
school grounds, which is the reason why these measures only provide an
illusory sense of security. Crystal Garcia reports that a mere 32 percent
of the school safety officers that she interviewed believed that strict
security measures effectively prevented violence in their schools.149 The
atrocity that took place in Littleton, Colorado, occurred at a school that

1992, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 773 (1993), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00022011.htm (reporting that students
who attended schools using metal detectors were less likely to carry a weapon inside a
school (7.8 percent versus 13.6 percent), but the use of metal detectors did not reduce
school violence); Renee Wilson-Brewer & Howard Spivak, Violence Prevention in
Schools and Other Community Settings: The Pediatrician as Initiator, Educator,
Collaborator, and Advocate, 94 PEDIATRICS 623, 626–27 (1994) (stating that one school
system in New York City reported that after the school security staff began using
hand-held metal detectors to conduct unannounced lobby searches of students at the
beginning of the school day, weapon-related incidents decreased in thirteen of fifteen
schools); Rachana Bhatt & Tomek Davis, The Impact of Random Metal Detector
Searches on School Violence, Contraband Possession, and Perceptions of Safety 22–23
(Dec. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.yumpu.com/en/
document/view/11524996/the-impact-of-random-metal-detector-searches-on-georgiastate- (reporting that, when comparing two school districts in Florida, the district that
used random metal detector searches reduced the probability of a student bringing a
weapon to school).
148. See KUPCHIK, supra note 68, at 7–9 (arguing that punitive measures
increase rather than decrease student misbehavior). Ascher, supra note 140, at 5 (arguing
that strict security measures “increase, rather than alleviate, tension in schools”); Beger,
supra note 67, at 340 (explaining that “aggressive security measures produce alienation
and mistrust among students”); Michael Easterbrook, Taking Aim at Violence, 32
PSYCHOL. TODAY 52, 56 (1999) (arguing that strict security measures alienate students);
Clifford H. Edwards, Student Violence and the Moral Dimensions of Education, 38
PSYCHOL. SCHS. 249, 250 (2001) (observing that “intrusive strategies are likely to
undermine the trust needed to build cooperative school communities capable of really
preventing violence”); Mayer & Leone, supra note 147, at 350, 352 (finding that student
disorder and victimization were higher in schools using strict security measures and
arguing that “less attention should be paid to running schools in an overly restrictive
manner and rather, schools should concentrate more on communicating individual
responsibility to students”); Noguera, supra note 62, at 190–91 (observing that a “get
tough” approach can hamper school officials’ efforts to create safe environments because
coercive measures create mistrust and resistance among the student body); Noguera,
supra note 66, at 345 (“When children are presumed to be wild, uncontrollable, and
potentially dangerous, it is not surprising that antagonistic relations with the adults who
are assigned to control them develop.”).
149. See Crystal A. Garcia, School Safety Technology in America: Current Use
and Perceived Effectiveness, 14 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 30, 40 (2003).
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had metal detectors and armed guards.150 In 2005, a student shot another
student in a Red Lake, Minnesota, high school that had metal detectors,
perimeter fencing, and guards.151 Ronald Stephens, an executive director
of the National School Safety Center, points out that strict security
measures are “more of a comfort” because “rule-followers will follow
the rules[, and r]ule-breakers will break the rules.”152 Indeed, many
scholars and commentators report that students know how to bring
weapons into schools without being discovered by metal detectors.153
But perhaps most importantly, strict security measures do not
address the underlying problems associated with school crime and thus
do not support the long-term solutions needed to effectively prevent
school violence.154 At a recent conference titled “Safe and Secure
Schools: Perspectives after Newtown,” Dr. Maurice Elias reminded us
that “[o]ur children cannot learn, and our teachers cannot teach, in
schools that are unsafe, unsupportive, uncaring, uncivil or lacking in
intellectual challenge. . . . These are the ultimate sources of school
security to children and in ways that are more lasting than metal
detectors.”155 In fact, two comprehensive studies on school safety both
independently concluded that one of the most important components—if
not the most important component—for establishing safe, secure schools
was not strict security measures but developing positive relationships
among members of the school community. The first study, conducted by
the U.S. Secret Service and the Department of Education,156 examined
150. See Marcus Wright, Experts Say Intrusive Security at Public Schools
Reproduces Social Inequality, MICH. CITIZEN (Nov. 15, 2012), http://
michigancitizen.com/dps-eaa-tighten-security/.
151. Sara Neufeld & Sumathi Reddy, Violent Week Renews Metal Detector
Debate, BALT. SUN, Oct. 14, 2006, at 1A, available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/
2006-10-14/news/0610140131_1_metal-detectors-school-students-park-elementaryschool.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Ascher, supra note 140, at 5 (“[T]hose few students intent on
bringing in weapons are inevitably a step ahead of the security devices, which means that
enforcement activities alone cannot create a safe school.”); Noguera, supra note 62, at
193 (reporting that most students he spoke to in his visits to urban schools knew how to
bring a weapon into schools using strict security measures without being detected);
Neufeld & Reddy, supra note 151 (reporting that students interviewed stated that it was
“easy to get around” metal detectors).
154. See KUPCHIK, supra note 68, at 6 (observing that the underlying issues for
student misbehavior often are not addressed by schools).
155. Joe Green, South Jersey Schools Discuss Safety Following ‘Perspectives
after Newtown’, NJ.COM (Jan. 23, 2013, 8:12 AM), http://www.nj.com/gloucestercounty/index.ssf/2013/01/south_jersey_schools_to_talk_s.html (internal quotation marks
omitted).
156. See ROBERT A. FEIN ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS: A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS AND
TO CREATING SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES (2002), available at http://www.secretservice.gov/
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thirty-seven incidents of school violence that occurred in U.S. schools
from 1974 to 2000.157 The joint report concluded:
In educational settings that support climates of safety, adults
and students respect each other. A safe school environment
offers positive personal role models in its faculty. It provides a
place for open discussion where diversity and differences are
respected; communication between adults and students is
encouraged and supported; and conflict is managed and
mediated constructively.158
The second study, conducted by Matthew Steinberg, Elaine
Allensworth, and David Johnson in the Chicago Public School System,159
found that even in schools with large populations of students from high
crime and high poverty areas, “it is the quality of relationships between
staff and students and between staff and parents that most strongly
defines safe schools.”160 Unfortunately, strict security measures may
even hinder the development of strong relationships among members of
the school community because they forge barriers of adversity and
mistrust.161 Rather than addressing the underlying issues, investing
millions of dollars in strict security measures diverts scarce resources
away from other programs and strategies that have proven to effectively
reduce school violence and enhance—not degrade—the learning
environment.162
The fact that schools with larger percentages of minority students
appear to be more inclined to rely on strict security measures is
ntac/ssi_guide.pdf. This report was brought again to the forefront by the Obama
administration after the Newtown shootings. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NOW IS THE TIME
12–13 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/wh_now_
is_the_time_full.pdf.
157. See FEIN ET AL., supra note 156, at 4.
158. Id. at 11. See also BARBARA FEDDERS, JASON LANGBERG & JENNIFER STORY,
SCHOOL SAFETY IN NORTH CAROLINA: REALITIES, RECOMMENDATIONS & RESOURCES 6
(2013), available at http://www.legalaidnc.org/public/learn/media_releases/2013_
MediaReleases/school-safety-in-north-carolina.pdf (“Positive relationships among
students, families, teachers, administrators, and staff are the most effective tools in
creating a safe school environment.”).
159. STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 112, at 15.
160. Id. at 1.
161. See, e.g., Beger, supra note 67, at 340; Noguera, supra note 62, at 190–91.
162. See, e.g., Hankin, Hertz & Simon, supra note 145, at 105 (“Metal detector
programs are expensive, and funds spent on metal detectors would not be available for
other programs and strategies that have been shown to be effective at reducing youth risk
for violence and promoting pro-social behaviors.”); Nance, supra note 10, at 48–55
(describing alternative methods that effectively reduce violence without degrading the
learning environment).
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particularly disturbing.163 The disproportionate use of strict security
measures on minorities is fundamentally unfair, exacerbates the
inequalities already present in our public education system, and can
potentially perpetuate racial inequalities in our society. Schools that
focus on custody and control rather than academic rigor may deprive
students of quality educational experiences that other students enjoy,
inhibiting minority students’ future educational and employment
opportunities.164 In addition, as discussed above, the use of strict security
measures—especially when used in conjunction with zero-tolerance
policies—is part and parcel of the school-to-prison pipeline, which also
severely limits students’ future opportunities.165
Further, the use of strict security measures negatively affects
minorities’ perceptions of government authorities and can skew their
views about themselves and their roles in society.166 Henry Leonardatos,
an experienced school administrator in urban schools, worries that
minority students are subject to intense surveillance in both their
neighborhoods and schools and, accordingly, see their school as simply
“another appendage to the police state.”167 He is also concerned that
when minority students are treated like criminals, they begin to act like
criminals. He observes:
They play the role that is expected of them—they will play the
role of the criminal and victimizer because the cops will say,
“don’t do this and don’t [do] that.” When you do that to a kid
you’re telling the kid that this is how the world is supposed to
be. You end [up] putting the idea in the kid’s head that this is
what he’s supposed to be doing.168

163. See Nance, supra note 10, at 41.
164. See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 42, (manuscript at 7) (“[M]arginalized
youth are presumed to be young criminals and treated as such through exposure to the
hard edge of exclusive practices (e.g., police surveillance and metal detectors), while
youth with social, political, and cultural capital are presumed to be near normal and
habituated for social absorption in their selective exposure to inclusive security
regimes.”).
165. See supra notes 123–29, and accompanying text.
166. See Noguera, supra note 66, at 343–44.
167. Daryl Khan, Perps or Pupils? Safety Policy Creates Prison-like New York
City Schools, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Sept. 20, 2012), http://jjie.org/york-story/;
accord VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS xiv,
133–38 (2011) (maintaining that low-income and minority youth experience surveillance
disproportionately because there is a “system in which schools, police, probation officers,
families, community centers, the media, businesses, and other institutions systematically
treat young people’s everyday behaviors as criminal activity”).
168. Khan, supra note 167.
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Indeed, scholars have long understood that the way students are labeled
and treated affects how students learn, act, view themselves, and what
they become.169
Moreover, the trust necessary to establish a healthy learning
environment is severely undermined when minority students are aware
that strict security measures are applied disproportionately.170 As Linda
Darling-Hammond maintains,
Young people are very observant. They note these patterns, and
they understand when they have been identified as not
deserving a high-quality, humane education. It is little wonder
that in settings like these, students of color may come to doubt
their academic ability and distrust the school, ultimately
rejecting what it was to offer.171
A recent example illustrates this point well. When Minerva Dickson
discovered that other students were not subject to the strict security
conditions she faced every day, it “blew her mind.”172 She commented, “I
thought all schools were like mine . . . . I couldn’t believe a student could
just walk into their school without dealing with all that.”173
Unfortunately, the disproportionate use of strict security measures on
minorities may further impair the often strained relationships of trust that
already exist between many minority students and educators.174
169. See Noguera, supra note 66, at 343. See generally RONNIE CASELLA, BEING
DOWN: CHALLENGING VIOLENCE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2001).
170. See Glennon, Looking for Air, supra note 17, at 112 (maintaining that it is
difficult for schools to create positive learning climates when students see racial
disparities in the application of discipline).
171. DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 17, at 65.
172. See Khan¸ supra note 167.
173. Id. Paul Hirschfield’s interview of a former inner-city student also
illustrates the sense of unfairness some students perceive. This student commented,
That school was run more like a prison than a high school. It don’t have to be
nothing illegal about it. But you’re getting arrested. No regard for if a college
going to accept you with this record. No regard for none of that, because
you’re not expected to leave this school and go to college. You’re not
expected to do anything.
Hirschfield, supra note 65, at 79.
174. See Constance Flanagan et al., School and Community Climates and Civic
Commitments: Patterns for Ethnic Minority and Majority Students, 99 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL.
421, 423 (2007) (observing that studies show that minority groups report “a lower sense
of school belonging than do their European American peers”); Susan Rakosi Rosenbloom
& Niobe Way, Experiences of Discrimination among African American, Asian American,
and Latino Adolescents in an Urban High School, 35 YOUTH & SOC. 420, 434 (2004)
(stating that “[w]hen African American and Latino students were asked about their
experiences with discrimination, they described hostile relationships with adults in
positions of authority such as . . . teachers in school”); Rosa Hernández Sheets, Urban
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Disproportionate use also may lead to more disorder and student
behavior problems. One of the most consistent findings of empirical
research is that students tend to follow rules when they believe those
rules are fair and evenly applied.175
III. A REFORMULATED FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
This Part begins with the premise that the use of strict security
measures in schools is inconsistent with students’ best interests and
delegitimizes the educational process, especially when they are applied
disproportionately to minorities and low-income students.176 The
question is what to do about it. Elsewhere, I have strongly advocated that
school-led reform is the most effective means for addressing this
problem and have described several measures that school administrators
can adopt to reduce violence more effectively in both their schools and in
their communities, including restorative justice initiatives, a data-driven
program called School-wide Positive Behavioral Interventions and
Supports, and other initiatives targeted to develop emotional and social
stability.177 I have also encouraged state and federal agencies to stop
providing grants for strict security measures and, instead, to make those
funds available to support alternative initiatives.178 Further, I have called
on the U.S. Department of Education to provide grants for researchers to
more closely study the harmful effects of strict security measures and
have recommended that the Department of Education’s Office of Civil
Rights play a more active role in addressing the disproportionate use of
strict security measures on minority students.179 I also believe that state
legislatures should provide the necessary funding, training, and
incentives for schools to implement these alternative measures.
Classroom Conflict: Student-Teacher Perception: Ethnic Integrity, Solidarity, and
Resistance, 28 URB. REV. 165, 175–76 (1996) (reporting that minority students in a study
on classroom conflict believed that their teachers did not care about them or respect them
and that they abused their authority); cf. Noguera, supra note 62, at 201 (observing that
many black communities believe that black children are not treated fairly in schools).
175. See KUPCHIK, supra note 68, at 7–8. See also Tyler & Rankin, supra note
141, at 361–62 (finding that harsh surveillance systems engender mistrust, especially
with respect to racial minority groups, leading them to disobey the rules).
176. See supra Part II.
177. See Jason P. Nance, School Security Considerations after Newtown, 65
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 103, 108–09 (2013). It bears noting that the U.S. Department of
Education’s Office of Civil Rights very recently recommended that schools implement
these alternative approaches to promote safe and orderly school climates. See DEAR
COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 30, at app. 2; see also GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note
95, at 5–7.
178. Nance, supra note 10, at 55.
179. Id.
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While I continue to support these recommendations, I believe that
courts also have an important role to play in addressing this problem. In
fact, courts are uniquely situated to address this issue in a way that
perhaps other government bodies are not. Currently, policymakers and
school officials are mired in a school security political quagmire
resulting from recent highly publicized incidents of school violence—
most notably the Newtown tragedy. Policymakers and school officials
are under enormous pressure to demonstrate to their constituencies that
they are taking steps to address the perceived school safety crisis by
spending substantial sums of money to purchase strict security measures.
When political trends threaten core rights and values, courts have a
responsibility to establish a clear constitutional standard to guide these
government bodies. This is particularly important in schools because
they are charged with the responsibility of inculcating students with the
constitutional values that underpin our democracy.180 Once courts set this
standard, I believe that lawmakers and school officials will put their
resources to better use and tackle school crime in a more pedagogically
sound manner that is more consistent with students’ constitutional rights.
180. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373–74 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the
meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing citizenry.”); Doe v.
Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027–28 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (“Schools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good citizenship
when the school authorities themselves disregard the fundamental principles
underpinning our constitutional freedoms.”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (“That [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason
for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of
our government as mere platitudes.”); Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the
Cure for De Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1992)
(arguing that students have the right to be subjected to a socializing process that
inculcates values consistent with the Constitution); Feld, supra note 87, at 963 (“Schools
are the incubators of future citizens, and school officials convey moral lessons by their
actions. Providing young people with real Fourth Amendment protection and meaningful
enforcement mechanisms will better socialize them to participate effectively in a
democratic society as adults.”); Martin R. Gardner, Strip Searching Students: The
Supreme Court’s Latest Failure to Articulate a “Sufficiently Clear” Statement of Fourth
Amendment Law, 80 MISS. L.J. 955, 997 (2011) (“Teaching students to obey society’s
laws is surely a fundamental aspect of their learning the meaning of good citizenship.”);
Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict between Authority and
Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1648 (1986) (explaining that
schools play a critical role in helping students learn necessary skills and society’s
common values, which enables them to exercise the responsibilities of citizenship);
Samantha E. Shutler, Random, Suspicionless Drug Testing of High School Athletes, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1265, 1302–03 (1996) (“In order to preserve Constitutional
reverence among a youth that is rapidly losing respect for many of the traditional
underpinnings of our society, courts must not assist in eroding what little respect remains
for the Constitution and the rights it provides.”).
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Drawing from alternative theories proposed by scholars to evaluate
Fourth Amendment rights in other contexts—as well as a recent theory
Catherine Kim offered to evaluate students’ due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment181—this Part describes a reformulated test under
the Fourth Amendment to evaluate the use of strict security measures in
schools.182
Before discussing the reformulated balancing test under the Fourth
Amendment, it is important to explain that neither the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 currently provides a satisfactory method to redress the problem
that harsh security measures are disproportionately applied to minority
students generally.183 In Washington v. Davis,184 two unsuccessful black
applicants to the Washington, D.C. police force claimed that the police
department’s recruiting procedures discriminated on the basis of race in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.185 The applicants challenged the
police department’s use of a personnel test that was designed to test
verbal ability, vocabulary, reading, and comprehension, claiming that
this test bore no relationship to job performance and excluded a
disproportionate number of black applicants.186 The Supreme Court held
that while the central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to
prevent official misconduct discriminating on the basis of race, “a law or
other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, [will not be considered] unconstitutional solely

181. See Kim, supra note 9, at 864–65.
182. Alternative Fourth Amendment tests proposed by scholars can be distilled
into two major categories: (a) tests that call for a reformulated balancing test (or to do
away with a balancing test altogether); and (b) tests based on the political process theory.
See Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107,
127–36 (2010). In this Article, I propose a reformulated balancing test. However, a test
based on the political process theory, which I will discuss in an upcoming scholarly
article, would also be a suitable alternative framework to the test courts currently employ.
The political process theory is most associated with the work of John Hart Ely, see JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87–88 (1980),
but it has also been applied to the Fourth Amendment. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L.
Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998); Michael J.
Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747,
763–68 (1991); Slobogin, supra, at 136–38; William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains,
Government Power and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 588 (1992)
[hereinafter Stuntz, Implicit Bargains]; William J. Stuntz, Local Policing after the
Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137 (2002); Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis
Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93 (2007).
183. The relevant provisions of Title VI are codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000d–2000d-1 (2006).
184. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
185. Id. at 232–33.
186. Id. at 234–35.
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because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”187 The Court
continued:
[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving
ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it
may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by
the Constitution.188
Thus, Washington v. Davis and other cases that followed made clear that
plaintiffs seeking to establish an Equal Protection Clause violation
cannot rely solely on disparate impact; rather, they must also have other
independent evidence that government officials acted with a
discriminatory intent when crafting their policies.189 And, as Derek Black
points out, “[e]vidence of discriminatory purpose in the various areas of
educational inequality is rarely obvious. . . . [F]ew school systems today
would openly engage in blatant discrimination.”190 Instead, racial
discrimination today is more often the result of subtle or unconscious
biases.191
187. Id. at 239. See also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266 n.15 (1977) (“In many instances, to recognize the limited probative
value of disproportionate impact is merely to acknowledge the ‘heterogeneity’ of the
Nation’s population.”).
188. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
189. See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (holding that although
disparate impact “may provide an important starting point . . . impact alone is not
determinative”); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 1983) (“It is,
rather, the cumulative evidence of action and inaction which objectively manifests
discriminatory intent.”); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1293
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987) (“The factors that are to be
considered in determining whether actions were taken with discriminatory intent include
the degree of any discriminatory effect; the historical background of the actions; the
specific sequence of events leading up to the actions; the presence or absence of
departures from normal procedures or substantive criteria; and the legislative history of
the actions.”). See also MARK G. YUDOF, BETSY LEVIN, RACHEL F. MORAN, JAMES E.
RYAN & KRISTI L. BOWMAN, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 430 (5th ed. 2012)
(discussing Washington v. Davis and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.).
190. See DEREK BLACK, EDUCATION LAW: EQUALITY, FAIRNESS, AND REFORM
147 (2013).
191. Id. See also Gary Blasi, Advocacy against the Stereotype: Lessons from
Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1276 (2002) (arguing that
Americans’ behavior is driven to some degree by unconscious racial stereotypes);
Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L.
REV. 741, 741 (2005) (arguing that discrimination is still pervasive, but most often
emerging in the form of stereotyping or unconscious bias); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of
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A satisfactory remedy under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is also difficult to obtain under the current state of the law. Title VI
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, color, or national origin
by programs receiving federal funds.192 Although the OCR’s regulations
prohibit schools from implementing facially neutral policies that result in
disparate impact,193 in Alexander v. Sandoval194 the Supreme Court held
that there is no private right of action to enforce the OCR’s disparate
impact regulations.195 And while the OCR continues to enforce its
disparate impact regulations,196 one significant enforcement challenge
may be to identify a district or school policy that has a disparate impact
on an identifiable racial group within that district or school.197 Stated
Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1506–14 (2005) (discussing social cognition research that
demonstrates that most people have implicit biases against racial minorities); Shani King,
The Family Law Canon in a (Post?) Racial Era, 72 OHIO STATE L.J. 575, 628 (2011)
(“[N]ot only is it rare for racial motives to be articulated, but they are often
subconscious.”); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1164 (1995) (arguing that unconscious bias is the most prevalent form of
discrimination).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (“No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”).
193. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2013) (providing that recipients of federal
funds may not “utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin”).
194. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
195. Id. at 281. Although Sandoval did not address § 1983, Justice John Paul
Stevens’s dissent suggested that private plaintiffs could assert that Title VI disparate
impact regulations create a federal right, which is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
at 299–302 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, most circuits have rejected this view. See
Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 316 n.9 (4th Cir. 2003) (disallowing a private cause of
action under § 1983 based on a federal regulation); Kissimmee River Valley Sportsman
Ass’n v. City of Lakeland, 250 F.3d 1324, 1327 (11th Cir. 2001). But see Robinson v.
Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1186–87 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that § 1983 allows a private
cause of action for violating 34 C.F.R. § 100). Robinson is the only court of appeals case
to adopt Stevens’s opinion on the § 1983 issue. Sam Spital, Restoring Brown’s Promise
of Equality after Alexander v. Sandoval: Why We Can’t Wait, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER
L.J. 93, 112 (2003). Further, federal appellate courts have rejected attempts to establish
discriminatory intent based on the school officials’ deliberate indifference to the disparate
impact of school policies. See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548,
567–68 (3d Cir. 2002).
196. See, e.g., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 30, at 11 (“Schools also
violate Federal law when they evenhandedly implement facially neutral policies and
practices that, although not adopted with the intent to discriminate, nonetheless have an
unjustified effect of discriminating against students on the basis of race. The resulting
discriminatory effect is commonly referred to as ‘disparate impact.’”).
197. See Daniel J. Losen & Christopher Edley, Jr., The Role of Law in Policing
Abusive Disciplinary Practices: Why School Discipline Is a Civil Rights Issue, in ZERO
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another way, in schools implementing intense surveillance conditions,
typically all students in a school or district are subject to those
conditions; thus, usually there will be no school or district policies that a
student can identify that are applied disproportionately in that school or
district.198 Nevertheless, simply because all of the students in a school or
district are subject to the same harsh conditions should not justify a
school or district’s actions to create a prison-like environment for
students.
Accordingly, I turn to a solution under the Fourth Amendment,
which also has a distinct advantage. While the disparate application of
strict security measures to minorities is inequitable and harmful, a
prison-like environment for any student is harmful. Thus, a solution
under the Fourth Amendment focuses on the crux of the problem: that a
student’s—any student’s—expectation of privacy is violated when a
school creates a prison-like environment in schools. It is the student’s
sense of dignity that has been violated in a place where government
officials should be preserving dignity, where students should be building
self-worth and building confidence in themselves, each other,
government institutions, and our democratic society.199 The fact that
minorities are disproportionately subjected to prison-like environments
in schools only exacerbates that indignity and teaches harmful lessons to
both white and minority students, as well as low-income and affluent
students.200 Subpart A describes the current test under the Fourth
Amendment, and Subpart B proposes a reformulated balancing test.
A. The Current Test
School officials—who are government officials for constitutional
law purposes, but are not law enforcement officers—generally perform
or oversee two types of searches on students: (a) searches based on
individualized suspicion to uncover evidence of wrongful behavior, and
(b) random, suspicionless searches on the general student population or
on a segment of the student population to deter school crime. Courts
TOLERANCE: RESISTING THE DRIVE FOR PUNISHMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS: A HANDBOOK FOR
PARENTS, STUDENTS, EDUCATORS, AND CITIZENS 237 (William Ayers, Bernardine Dohrn
& Rick Ayers eds., 2001).
198. Indeed, many school districts throughout the country serve primarily
minority students, especially those districts situated in large metropolitan areas. See U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 100 LARGEST PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008–09, at iii (2010) (stating that
the “majority of students in the 100 largest school districts were Hispanic or Black”).
199. See Gardner, supra note 136, at 943.
200. See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and
Race, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 42 (1997); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing
Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn’t Enough, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1999).
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evaluate searches based on individualized suspicion under a
reasonableness standard the Supreme Court developed in New Jersey v.
T.L.O.,201 where the Court determined (1) “‘whether the . . . action was
justified at its inception,’” and (2) “whether the search as actually
conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.’” 202 This Article, however, is
primarily concerned with the use of suspicionless searches that are
designed to deter, detect, or prevent crime by routinely subjecting a
group of students—the vast majority of whom are innocent and have no
plans at all to commit any type of wrongdoing—to a significant intrusion
of their privacy interests.203 The Fourth Amendment currently offers
students almost no protection from random, suspicionless searches
designed to deter school crime.204 When the students’ expectation of
privacy is weighed against the government interest in protecting students
from harm, the government almost always prevails.205
The test to evaluate suspicionless searches in schools was first
described in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton.206 In Vernonia, the
Court evaluated a school district’s suspicionless drug-testing program on
student athletes.207 Students wishing to participate in interscholastic

201. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
202. Id. at 340–41 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). See also
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009). Although outside of the
scope of this Article, as commentators and courts have observed, the increased presence
of law enforcement officers in schools and the increased use of evidence to prosecute
students have complicated this analysis. See Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the
Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School Searches
Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2003) (arguing that
courts should apply the probable cause standard when school searches involve law
enforcement officers or when school officials are required to turn evidence of criminal
violations over to the police); Lisa H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners:
When Law Enforcement Meets Discipline in Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977,
982–86 (2009/10) (describing the disparate views of courts when analyzing student
searches involving law enforcement officers).
203. In the Fourth Amendment scholarship and case law, these searches also
have been called government dragnets, special needs searches, or administrative searches.
I emphasize that my proposed legal analysis should not necessarily apply to situations
where there is an imminent threat of harm to students, such as when school officials have
received a warning from a credible source that a student has brought a loaded weapon to
school and intends to harm other students.
204. See supra Part II.A.3. But see Nance, supra note 76, at 376–94 (arguing that
the Fourth Amendment requires that students receive greater protection from highly
intrusive search practices such as searches through students’ belongings).
205. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825–27 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
664–65 (1995).
206. 515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995).
207. Id. at 650.
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sports would be tested at the beginning of the season, and each week of
the season, a student under the supervision of two adults would blindly
select 10 percent of the student-athlete population for drug testing.208 In
the fall of 1991, James Acton, a seventh-grade student who was well
behaved and who did not have a drug problem, signed up to play
football.209 The school officials would not allow James to participate in
school athletics because he and his parents refused to sign a drug-testing
consent form.210 The Actons claimed that Vernonia’s drug-testing
program violated the Fourth Amendment, but the Court disagreed.211
The Court observed that, as the text of the Fourth Amendment
directs, the constitutionality of a government search ultimately turns on
“reasonableness.”212 Whether a search meets the reasonableness standard
is determined “by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”213 Accordingly, the Court’s framework for evaluating
suspicionless searches consists of the following three factors: (1) “the
scope of the legitimate expectation of privacy at issue,” (2) “the character
of the intrusion that is complained of,”214 and (3) “the nature and
immediacy of the governmental concern at issue . . . and the efficacy of
this means for meeting it.”215
While acknowledging that students retain some expectation of
privacy at school, the Court explained that the scope of students’ privacy
rights “are different in public schools than elsewhere.”216 According to
the Court, “the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’
custodial and tutelary responsibilit[ies],” which required students’
208. Id.
209. See Robert M. Bloom, The Story of Pottawatomie County v. Lindsay Earls:
Drug Testing in the Public Schools, in EDUCATION LAW STORIES 337, 346 (Michael A.
Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2008) (“At the time, James said, ‘I was like one of
the smartest kids in class. I never got a referral (to the principal’s office) and I thought
that was probably enough for them to see I wasn’t taking drugs.’”).
210. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 651.
211. Id. at 651, 664–65.
212. Id. at 652. The text of the Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
213. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652–53 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Assn.,
489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).
214. Id. at 658.
215. Id. at 660.
216. Id. at 656.
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expectation of privacy to be diminished.217 The Court reasoned that if
schools are to carry out their important educational mission and provide
a “proper educational environment,” it must authorize “a degree of
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults.”218
Thus, the nature of students’ constitutional rights “is what is appropriate
for children in school.”219 Importantly, when establishing this diminished
expectation of privacy of students, the Court relied on several prior cases
where the Court similarly reduced students’ constitutional rights in light
of the school’s responsibility to provide an appropriate environment
conducive to learning.220 Viewing this diminished expectation of privacy
against (a) the “minimally intrusive” drug-testing conditions that
resembled conditions that students commonly encounter in public
restrooms, (b) the school district’s important interest in deterring drug
use, and (c) the rampant use of drugs among the student athletes in
Vernonia School District, the Court upheld the district’s drug-testing
policy.221
Seven years later, in Board of Education v. Earls,222 the Court
arguably abridged students’ Fourth Amendment rights even further.
There, the Court upheld a program requiring students enrolled in
extracurricular activities to submit to random drug testing.223 But unlike
in Vernonia, where the Court justified those suspicionless searches in
part because the drug problem in the district was “alarming,” the school
district in Earls had made no such showing.224
217. See id.
218. Id. at 655.
219. Id. at 656.
220. Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988);
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 US. 675, 684 (1986); Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 682 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581–82 (1975)).
221. Id. at 658, 661–63. In dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor heavily
criticized the Court’s decision to eliminate the individualized suspicion requirement
outlined in T.L.O. Id. at 681 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). O’Connor was concerned that
suspicionless searches send harmful messages to students that they cannot be trusted. Id.
at 682. She argued,
[I]ntrusive, blanket searches of schoolchildren, most of whom are innocent,
for evidence of serious wrongdoing are not part of any traditional school
function of which I am aware. Indeed, many schools, like many parents,
prefer to trust their children unless given reason to do otherwise. As James
Acton’s father said on the witness stand, “[suspicionless testing] sends a
message to children that are trying to be responsible citizens . . . that they
have to prove that they’re innocent . . . , and I think that kind of sets a bad
tone for citizenship.”
Id.
222. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
223. Id. at 825.
224. Id. at 849 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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In Earls, Lindsay Earls, a student enrolled in “the show choir, the
marching band, the Academic Team, and the National Honor Society,”
challenged Pottawatomie School District’s drug-testing policy as
unconstitutional.225 Earls argued that Pottawatomie had failed to identify
a special need for implementing its random drug-testing program
because it had not demonstrated that her school had a drug problem.226 In
a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court upheld Pottawatomie’s
drug-testing policy.227
The Court balanced the same three factors that it did in Vernonia,
largely reaching the same conclusions.228 The Court explained that
students’ privacy interests must be viewed in the context of the public
school environment. That is, when “the government acts as guardian and
tutor the relevant question is whether the search is one that a reasonable
guardian and tutor might undertake.”229 Thus, a student’s privacy interest
is limited in a place where the government has a responsibility to
maintain discipline, health, and safety.230
Departing somewhat from the holding in Vernonia, the Court held
that it was unnecessary for the district to identify a drug abuse problem
before imposing a suspicionless drug-testing policy.231 The Court
justified the suspicionless drug-testing program because “the nationwide
drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every
school.”232 This broad holding has provided a clear path for schools to
conduct a sweeping array of suspicionless search practices without first
having to demonstrate a drug or weapons problem.233 As a result of this
movement in the law, lower courts routinely justify the use of a variety
of random, suspicionless search practices in schools.234

225. Id. at 826–27.
226. Id. at 827.
227. Id. at 824–25.
228. Id. at 830–38; see also Nance, supra note 76, at 384–87.
229. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 665 (1995)).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 835.
232. Id. at 834.
233. See supra Part II.A.3. But see Nance, supra note 76, at 391–94 (arguing that
the Fourth Amendment requires school officials to have particularized evidence of a
substance use or weapons problem before performing suspicionless searches that are
“highly intrusive,” such as a search through a student’s personal belongings).
234. See supra Part II.A.3.
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B. A Reformulated Balancing Test

Many scholars have called for better balancing tests to evaluate
citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights when government officials conduct
suspicionless searches.235 Most of these scholars argue that courts should
afford less weight to the government’s interest and more weight to the
individuals’ interests.236 The reformulated balancing test proposed in this
Article also maintains that courts should afford more weight to students’
interests under certain circumstances—but for reasons grounded
primarily in pedagogy and the overall welfare of students. Working
primarily within the existing Fourth Amendment framework, this
Subpart identifies two different ways that a court can afford more
weight—and why a court should afford more weight—to the students’
privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment when students are
subjected to prison-like conditions in schools. The first way is rooted in
the Court’s cases evaluating students’ rights under the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. The second way is to rethink the concept of
“intrusion.”
1. PEDAGOGICAL CONCERNS UNDERLIE THE COURT’S ANALYSES
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence evaluating students’ Fourth
Amendment rights is better understood when viewed in connection with
Supreme Court cases evaluating students’ First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. In these cases, the underlying justification for
abridging students’ constitutional rights in schools, including their
Fourth Amendment rights, is to promote the educational interests of the
students.237 That is, courts reduce students’ constitutional rights to
235. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO.
L.J. 1, 29–46 (2013); Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity through Children’s Rights,
2004 SUP. CT. REV. 355, 386–91; Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of
Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1157–60 (2012); Eve
Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254,
296–97 (2011); Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment
Enforcement, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1494–1502 (2010); Stuntz, Implicit Bargains,
supra note 182, at 553–55; Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy
or Mutual Trust between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1784–85
(1994).
236. See Slobogin, supra note 182, at 127.
237. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (holding that the
current framework needed to evaluate students’ Fourth Amendment rights in schools
must strike “a balance between the schoolchild’s legitimate expectations of privacy and
the school’s equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can
take place”). See also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1995)
(holding that the nature of students’ Fourth Amendment rights in schools “is what is
appropriate for children in school”); id. at 656 (“Fourth Amendment rights, no less than
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provide school officials with the constitutional leeway to create an
orderly environment conducive to learning.238 This Article maintains that
when this justification no longer holds true—when conducting
suspicionless searches or, worse, creating a prison-like environment
contributes to a deteriorated learning climate and harms the educational
interests of the students—students’ Fourth Amendment rights should not
be abridged but strengthened.
a. The foundational cases
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,239 the Court
evaluated students’ First Amendment right to wear black armbands to
publicize their objections to the Vietnam War and their support for a
truce.240 When school officials became aware of the students’ plan to
wear armbands, the officials adopted a policy that all students wearing
armbands would be asked to remove them, and if they refused, they
would be suspended until they did.241 When a group of students arrived
at school wearing their armbands, they were sent home and suspended
from school until they returned without them.242
The Court famously held in Tinker that students do not “shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate,”243 and that “state-operated schools may not be
enclaves of totalitarianism.”244 However, the Court also recognized the
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere;
the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary
responsibility for children.”); Kim, supra note 9, at 867.
238. While scholars disagree on how far students’ rights should extend in
schools, as Catherine Kim recently observed, “both sides of the debate share a common
starting point: such restrictions must be justified, if at all, by pedagogical goals.” Kim,
supra note 9, at 866. See also Dupre, supra note 106, at 53 (applauding the Supreme
Court’s recent jurisprudence that restricts students’ Fourth Amendment rights because
doing so enhances the ability of school officials to provide students with a serious
education); Levin, supra note 106, at 1648–49 (describing the need to find an equilibrium
between respecting students’ constitutional rights so that students learn to value those
rights, and restricting students’ rights to help school officials maintain an orderly
environment conducive to learning); James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public
Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1338–43 (2000) (arguing that courts understandably limit
students’ free speech, right to privacy, and due process rights in schools because there,
the government acts as an educator, and it would be impossible to “fully protect[]
students’ constitutional rights while simultaneously ensuring the effective operation of
public schools”).
239. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
240. Id. at 505.
241. Id. at 504.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 506.
244. Id. at 511.
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comprehensive authority of school officials “consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in schools.”245
Thus, while the Court maintained that the Constitution protected the
students’ right to express their views in schools, it also restricted those
rights if speech “materially disrupt[ed] classwork or involve[d]
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”246 In Tinker,
because the record did not show that the students materially disrupted the
learning environment, interfered with school activities, or intruded in the
lives of others, the Court concluded that the Constitution did not permit
school officials to deny the students the right to wear their armbands at
school.247
Tinker is important because the Court clearly articulated the general
principles for evaluating students’ constitutional rights in schools and
established the tone for cases that would follow. Students do not shed
their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate; yet, those rights must
be balanced against the school’s interest in providing a productive
learning environment. When students’ speech disrupts the learning
environment, school officials can limit students’ First Amendment right
to self-expression. Tinker is important for another reason as well. It
demonstrates the Court’s attempt to align its constitutional jurisprudence
affecting public schools with good educational policy. For example, the
Court emphasized the pedagogical benefits of safeguarding students’ free
speech rights. The Court noted that students are trained by exposure to a
“marketplace of ideas,” and suppressing students’ expressions would
dampen what should be a robust exchange of thoughts and opinions.248
Further, the Court explained that safeguarding students’ free speech
rights in schools would help them learn the importance of their
constitutional rights and not discount them “as mere platitudes.”249
Six years later, the Court invoked these same principles when
evaluating students’ right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment in disciplinary proceedings. In Goss v. Lopez,250 the Court
addressed whether a school district violated several high school students’
due process rights by temporarily suspending them without holding a

245. Id. at 507.
246. See id. at 513.
247. Id. at 514.
248. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
249. Id. at 507 (quoting W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943)). The Court has relied on this line of reasoning in several other First Amendment
cases when examining students’ constitutional rights. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393, 403–04 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988);
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986).
250. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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hearing.251 One of those students, Dwight Lopez, was suspended in
connection with a disturbance in the lunchroom that resulted in damage
to school property.252 Lopez claimed that he did not participate in the
destructive conduct but was only an innocent bystander.253 He was
nevertheless suspended without a hearing.254 Another student, Betty
Crome, was present at a demonstration that took place at a high school
that she did not attend.255 After she was arrested with the other students
and subsequently released without being formally charged, she received
notice from her school that she had been suspended for ten days.256 The
school did not provide a reason for the suspension; nor was Crome given
a hearing.257
The Court first held that although the Constitution does not
guarantee the right to an education at the public’s expense, these students
had a legitimate property interest because they were entitled to a public
education under their state’s constitution, and that interest could not be
taken away absent minimal procedures required under the Fourteenth
Amendment.258 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that students were not
entitled to the full panoply of protections normally provided to citizens
under the Fourteenth Amendment in other contexts such as criminal
proceedings.259 Thus, at least with respect to short suspensions, students
were not entitled to secure counsel, confront or cross-examine witnesses,
or call their own witnesses to support their version of the incident.260
Rather, students facing suspension were guaranteed only “some kind of
notice and afforded some kind of hearing.”261 The Court explained that in
the vast majority of cases, this constitutional requirement would be met if
school officials simply conducted “an informal give-and-take,” which
included informing the student of the misconduct and the basis for the
accusation, then providing the student with an opportunity to explain his
or her version of the facts.262
As in Tinker, the justification for abridging the students’
constitutional rights in Goss was to protect the state’s interest in

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 567.
Id. at 570.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 570–71.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 583.
See id.
Id. at 579 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 582, 584.
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providing an environment conducive to learning.263 The Court reasoned
that “[s]ome modicum of discipline and order is essential if the
educational function is to be performed.”264 The Court acknowledged
that disciplinary events are “frequent occurrences” and sometimes
require immediate action to be effective.265 Thus, an immediate response
to a violation of a school rule was not only “a necessary tool to maintain
order but a valuable educational device.”266 Equally important, as in
Tinker, Goss highlights the educational value of students retaining their
constitutional rights. The Court explained that the risk of error without
holding at least some kind of hearing “is not at all trivial,” and
it would be a strange disciplinary system in an educational
institution if no communication was sought by the
disciplinarian with the student in an effort to inform him of his
dereliction and to let him tell his side of the story in order to
make sure that an injustice is not done.267
Thus, it is apparent that the Court also was concerned that the students
perceived that they were treated fairly in a government institution
charged with teaching students about their constitutional rights.268
In his dissent, Justice Lewis Powell, joined by three other Justices,
sought to abridge students’ due process rights even further for
pedagogical reasons, arguing that students should not be entitled even to
the minimal due process protections outlined in the majority’s opinion.269
According to Justice Powell, students had no legitimate need for due
process protection because the government’s interest was aligned with
the students’ best long-term interests.270
In 1985, the Supreme Court in T.L.O. evaluated students’ Fourth
Amendment rights in schools for the first time, following the same
pattern it established in prior cases evaluating students’ free speech and

263. Id. at 580.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. The idea that suspension should be considered a “valuable educational
device” has received substantial criticism by scholars. See, e.g., Noguera, supra note 62,
at 342 (explaining that the students who are suspended or expelled often have the greatest
academic, economic, and social needs).
267. Goss, 419 U.S. at 580.
268. See also Levin, supra note 106, at 1676 (arguing that procedural protections
in schools is important because it socializes students to understand that they are respected
participants in the educational process, which is an important value to convey in a
democracy).
269. Goss, 419 U.S. at 585–86 (Powell, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 592–93.
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due process rights in Tinker and Goss.271 In T.L.O., a school official
searched high school freshman T.L.O.’s purse for cigarettes after a
teacher claimed that she spotted T.L.O. smoking in the bathroom and
T.L.O. denied those accusations.272 During the search, the school official
discovered marijuana and other materials suggesting that T.L.O. was
dealing marijuana.273 The school official turned the evidence over to the
police, who brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. in juvenile
court.274 T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the school
official’s search violated the Fourth Amendment.275 The Supreme Court
disagreed.276
As it did when evaluating students’ free speech and due process
rights, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of the search by
balancing T.L.O.’s expectation of privacy against the school’s need to
maintain an orderly environment conducive to learning.277 The Court first
explained that students have legitimate expectations of privacy in the
personal items they bring to school.278 At the same time, the Court
recognized that school officials have an “equally legitimate need to
maintain an environment in which learning can take place.”279 To strike a
balance, the Court held that school officials were not required to obtain a
warrant before searching a student, and a school official’s level of
suspicion need not rise to the level of “probable cause.”280 The Court
reasoned that the warrant and probable cause requirements did not suit
the “informality of the student-teacher relationship” because they would
unduly burden school officials and interfere with “the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures” necessary to maintain an effective and orderly
learning climate.281 Rather, the constitutionality of a search in school
depends on its reasonableness under the circumstances.282 The
271. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 327–28 (1985).
272. Id. at 328.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 328–29.
275. Id. at 329.
276. See id. at 332–33.
277. Id. at 337–39.
278. Id. at 338–39. The court reasoned that a “search of a child’s person or of a
closed purse or other bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search carried out
on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy.” Id.
at 337–38. According to the Court, “schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry with
them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that
they have necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them
onto school grounds.” Id. at 339.
279. Id. at 340.
280. Id. at 340–41.
281. Id. at 340.
282. Id. at 341.
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determination of “reasonableness” involves a two-fold inquiry: (1)
“‘whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,’” and (2) “whether
the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’”283
Using this framework, the Court concluded that the search was
constitutional.284
In his concurrence, Justice Powell reiterated his insistence that the
government’s interest aligned with the students’ interests, making it
“unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protections
granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool setting.”285
The Court generally maintained this line of reasoning when
evaluating students’ Fourth Amendment rights in the context of
suspicionless searches in Vernonia and Earls. As explained above in
both Vernonia and Earls—as in Tinker—the Court acknowledged that
children “assuredly do not ‘shed their constitutional rights . . . at the
schoolhouse gate,’”286 but reasoned that students’ “Fourth Amendment
rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different
in public schools than elsewhere.”287 According to the Court, the
“reasonableness” inquiry could not disregard a school’s tutelary and
custodial responsibilities; thus, the nature of a student’s Fourth
Amendment rights “is what is appropriate for children in school.”288
Further, in both cases, the Court justified the searches on the ground that
the government’s interest and the students’ interest were aligned. For
example, in Vernonia the Court explained that deterring drug use—
especially among student athletes—was important because of the
physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs, and drug use
disrupts the educational process.289

283. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
284. Id. Although T.L.O. has been criticized for not expressly requiring that
school officials have an individualized suspicion before searching a student, see, e.g.,
Gardner, supra note 136, at 924, it squarely held that students indeed do possess Fourth
Amendment rights at schools. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333. This case overturned several lower
court decisions that applied the in loco parentis doctrine, holding that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to school searches because school administrators acted in the
place of parents during school hours. See Nance, supra note 76, at 377 n.38.
285. Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).
286. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 844 (2002) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S 646, 655–56 (1995)); accord. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655–56 (quoting Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
287. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655–56 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506); accord.
Earls, 536 U.S. at 844 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655–56).
288. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656; accord. Earls, 536 U.S. at 844 (quoting
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656).
289. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661–62. See also Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
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More recently, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of
a student search in Safford Unified School District v. Redding.290 In
Redding, the Court did not evaluate the constitutionality of a random,
suspicionless search as it did in Vernonia and Earls; instead, the Court
evaluated the legality of a strip search performed on a thirteen-year-old
female student who was accused of bringing unauthorized prescription
and over-the-counter drugs to school.291 As in T.L.O., the Court again
recognized that students’ Fourth Amendment rights are abridged in
schools, reasoning that searches in the school setting “‘require[] some
modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a
search.’”292 Relying on the same two factors the Court delineated in
T.L.O., the Court concluded that the search violated the Constitution
because it was excessively intrusive in light of the age of the student and
the nature of the school violation.293 Notably, as it had in prior cases, the
Court in Redding displayed a willingness to rely on pedagogical
considerations not only to justify the abridgment of students’ rights in
schools, but also to make its determination of whether the search itself
was constitutional. When evaluating the student’s expectation of privacy
in the school setting, the Court acknowledged that the strip search was
embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating, and that there was empirical
evidence indicating that strip searches could “result in serious emotional
damage” for students.294 It further noted that a strip search was so
degrading to students that many schools had banned them under all
circumstances.295
b. A more balanced approach
As the above cases demonstrate, the Court has repeatedly held that
although students do not lose their constitutional rights upon entering the
schoolhouse gates, students in school do not have the same rights they
290. 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
291. Id. at 368.
292. Id. at 370 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985)).
293. Id. at 373–77.
294. Id. at 374–75 (citing Irwin A. Hyman & Donna C. Perone, The Other Side
of School Violence: Educator Policies and Practices That May Contribute to Student
Misbehavior, 36 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 7, 13 (1998)).
295. Id. at 375. Nevertheless, despite the Court’s ruling that the search violated
the Fourth Amendment, the Court refused to hold the school officials accountable. Id. at
377–79. The Court determined that the school officials were protected under the qualified
immunity doctrine because “the very action in question [had not] previously been held
unlawful” and there were cases in the lower courts that viewed strip searches differently.
Id. (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). As some scholars have noted,
this case demonstrates how difficult it is for students to recover for unlawful searches.
See Feld, supra note 87, at 947–54.
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have outside of school. A primary justification that the Court relies on to
abridge students’ constitutional rights—including their Fourth
Amendment rights—is to promote the educational interests of the
students.296 Stated another way, for pedagogical reasons, the Court
dilutes students’ constitutional rights to provide flexibility for school
officials to preserve an orderly environment conducive to learning.297
Relatedly, the Court also justifies reducing students’ constitutional rights
on the ground that students’ interests are aligned with the government’s
interest, and thus, heightened constitutional protections are unnecessary
because school officials have students’ best interests in mind.298
This Article maintains that if students can demonstrate that this
justification is no longer true—that conducting random, suspicionless
searches promotes an environment that is antithetical to learning or does
not promote the educational interests of the students—their privacy
interests should be given greater consideration against the government’s
interest to conduct these searches. To make this assessment, a court
should consider evidence regarding the effect of the challenged search
practices on the learning environment. For example, the court might
evaluate evidence assessing school climate; student learning; whether
students are fearful and distrustful; whether school crime or disorder
decreased or increased as a result of using these search tactics; and how
the search practices affect students’ attitudes towards the government,
school officials, teachers, and other students. In addition, the court might
consider whether the use of these strict security measures exacerbates the
school-to-prison pipeline by increasing the number of suspensions,
expulsions, or referrals of students to the juvenile justice system for
infractions that could be handled better internally. The court also might
consider whether students attending schools with high minority
populations perceive that they are being treated differently than students
in other settings. Using such criteria, a court could declare these
suspicionless search practices unconstitutional, which would encourage
schools to rely on alternative measures to decrease crime and, if
necessary, to conduct searches based only on individualized suspicion.
Such a test more closely aligns with the overall tenor of cases evaluating

296. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. See also Kim, supra note 9, at
861–67.
297. See also Kim, supra note 9, at 866–67, 873–74.
298. Kim, supra note 9, at 867 (“Central to [the] defense of restrictions on
students’ rights is the assumed alignment of interests between students and school
officials.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding
Public, 1989 S. CT. REV. 87, 117 (reasoning that in school searches, “[b]oth the
investigating authority and the person searched are participants in a shared mission”).
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students’ constitutional rights in schools and is more consistent with
good education policy and practice.299
To be clear, I do not propose that school officials should never be
permitted to use strict security measures; perhaps there are circumstances
where it would be appropriate to use them.300 Nevertheless, this modified
framework would send a clear message to school administrators that
strict security measures should be used only when they promote the
educational interests of the students rather than as a first response to
address school crime and disorder.
A proposed modification to align the constitutional rights of
juveniles with good policy grounded in empirical evidence, of course, is
not unprecedented in the case law. For example, at one time, adolescents
in juvenile court were not entitled to traditional procedural protections
provided to adults in criminal court because it was assumed that juvenile
courts were nonadversarial institutions with adolescents’ best interests in
mind.301 However, in light of the growing body of evidence that juvenile
court officials failed to provide adolescents with benevolent protection,
the Court in In re Gault302 determined that it was appropriate to extend at
least some procedural protections to adolescents.303 Similarly, in Miller v.
Alabama,304 Graham v. Florida,305 and Roper v. Simmons,306 the Court
relied on social science to conclude that the Eighth Amendment
precluded (1) a sentencing scheme mandating life in prison without the
possibility of parole for juveniles who committed homicide, (2) life
without parole for juveniles who committed a non-homicide offense, and

299. See Kim, supra note 9, at 892–900 (arguing, in the context of students’ due
process rights, that courts “should critically evaluate the operation of school discipline to
ensure that it actually advances the educational interests that previously justified
insulating school discipline from closer judicial scrutiny”); see also Tamar R. Birckhead,
Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1447, 1495–97
(2009) (arguing that courts would benefit from the review of empirical data).
300. For example, scholars Paul Hirschfield and Katarzyna Celinska
acknowledge that failing to appropriately respond to dangerous and disruptive students
might also have an adverse effect on fear, trust, and the school climate. See Hirschfield &
Celinska, supra note 103, at 9. But Hirschfield and Celinska also argue that if school
officials decide to implement strict security measures in an effort to respond to prevailing
student norms and concerns, they should consider implementing at the same time softer
strategies such as mediation, counseling, and conflict resolution that promote orderliness
without harming trust. Id.
301. Kim, supra note 9, at 863.
302. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
303. Id. at 57–59; Kim, supra note 9, at 863–64.
304. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
305. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
306. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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(3) the death penalty for juveniles.307 And, in Safford Unified School
District v. Redding, the most recent case evaluating students’ Fourth
Amendment rights in schools, the Court cited social science evidence
indicating that strip searches could “result in serious emotional damage”
for students because they are so degrading.308
Further, this modification is fundamentally consistent with other
proposed Fourth Amendment balancing tests in other contexts. For
example, Alexander Reinert characterizes the reasonableness balancing
test as pitting the government interest against an individual’s privacy
interest but maintains that the government interest should be construed
more broadly to include important collective values, such as pluralist
civic participation and the efficient administration of criminal justice.309
According to Reinert, when searches undermine long-term public
interests such as ostracizing subgroups from the political process or
hindering future law enforcement efforts by increasing distrust between
students and law enforcement, courts might declare suspicionless search
practices to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.310 Shima
Baradaran argues that when analyzing suspicionless searches, courts
should consider broader societal data, such as potential racial targeting or
low hit rates, instead of making less-informed balancing decisions based
on only common sense.311 Fundamentally similar to these proposals, this
Article essentially argues that courts should consider school data
regarding the short-term and long-term impacts of suspicionless searches
on the learning environment to make an informed balancing decision
under the Fourth Amendment.312

307. See Miller 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (using social science to justify the decision to
preclude a sentencing scheme that mandated life in prison without the possibility of
parole for juvenile offenders); Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 74 (using social science to justify
the decision to preclude life without parole for juveniles who commit crimes other than
homicide); Roper, 543 U.S. at 573–74 (using social science to justify the decision to
preclude the death penalty for a juvenile defender). See also Barry C. Feld, Adolescent
Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham,
Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 L. & INEQUALITY 263, 264, 277–92 (2013)
(analyzing the social science research on which the Court relied in Roper, Graham, and
Miller).
308. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 373–74 (2009) (citing
Hyman & Perone, supra note 294, at 13).
309. Reinert, supra note 235, at 1467.
310. Id. at 1464–67, 1484–89.
311. See Baradaran, supra note 235, at 39, 43–45.
312. These rebalancing tests are consistent with the social science research that
demonstrates social costs associated with rules, policies, and laws that people view as
unfair, degrading, and intrusive. See Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 142, at 514; Tyler &
Rankin, supra note 141, at 361; see also supra Part II.C.
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c. Criticisms of the reformulated approach
Some might criticize this reformulated approach by arguing that the
justification for abridging students’ rights under the Fourth Amendment
is distinct from the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They might argue
that the Court’s justification, especially in Earls, is primarily grounded in
student safety concerns, not in having an orderly environment conducive
to learning.313 They also might argue that school officials should have the
constitutional leeway to use strict security measures to protect students at
almost all costs. My response to these arguments is twofold.
First, I maintain that a more complete view of the jurisprudence on
students’ constitutional rights—and even of the jurisprudence addressing
only students’ Fourth Amendment rights—is that safety is only one
aspect, albeit an important aspect, of an overarching concern for allowing
school officials to have the flexibility to fulfill their “custodial” and
“tutelary” responsibilities by providing an orderly environment
conducive to learning.314 While student safety is important, it is certainly
not the sole—or even the primary—responsibility of public schools.315
Rather, a more balanced look at the jurisprudence suggests that the Court
reduces students’ constitutional rights so that school officials can have
the flexibility to provide for the well-being of children. The way that
school officials primarily go about providing for the well-being of
children is to treat them with dignity and to provide them with an
appropriate learning environment. If courts permit school officials to
treat students like prisoners, students’ overall well-being is jeopardized,
and the learning environment is compromised. Stated another way,
school officials should not be able to hide behind the Constitution when
they treat students like prisoners because they are trying to keep students
“safe”—especially when there are more effective means for creating safe
schools that do not harm the learning environment or impair students’
313. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 831 (2002) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985)
(Powell, J., concurring)) (“‘Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order,
teachers cannot begin to educate their students. And apart from education, the school has
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children, and also to protect
teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has
prompted national concern.’”)
314. “Custodial” and “tutelary” both relate to “guardianship” or providing for the
care and well-being of another. See Custodial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/custodial (last visited Feb. 9, 2014); see
also Tutelary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/tutelary (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
315. In fact, in Vernonia, the Court hastens to emphasize that public schools do
not “have such a degree of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional ‘duty to
protect.’” See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (quoting
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).
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dignity.316 Furthermore, we must remember that strict security measures
do not guarantee students’ safety, and, in fact, may even compromise
it.317 Indeed, maintaining an appropriate learning environment is simply a
better foundation on which to build the Court’s Fourth Amendment
analysis.
Second, even if student safety is the sole justification by which the
Court abridges students’ Fourth Amendment rights, as explained above,
many scholars argue that implementing strict security measures increases
student behavioral problems and crime by alienating students.318
Accordingly, I propose that students, at minimum, should have the
opportunity to submit evidence demonstrating that the use of strict
security measures has not improved student safety. If this can be shown,
then students’ Fourth Amendment rights should be given greater
consideration against the government’s interest.
Some might also criticize the reformulated approach because it
provides less deference to school officials. They might argue that courts
should not second-guess school officials’ decision to use strict security
measures, nor should courts make assessments regarding the school
environment, because school officials are in a better position to make
316. See Nance, supra note 10, at 48–55.
317. See supra Part II.A. An example from the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) is
illustrative. Scholars Matthew Steinberg, Elaine Allensworth, and David Johnson, with
the cooperation of the Consortium on Chicago School Research at the University of
Chicago Urban Education Institute, conducted an in-depth study of school safety in the
CPS and observed the following:
Inside Lake Erie, the physical environment is dominated by crowd-control
mechanisms: metal detectors, which are present throughout CPS high
schools, greet students upon entering; folding tables corral students at the
main entrance and at informal security “checkpoints” throughout hallways;
folding metal gates are pulled across entrances to stairwells and padlocked.
There is a constant police presence outside and inside the school.
STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 112, at 15. Yet, despite all of these strict security measures,
substantial violence and disorder abounded in that school. Steinberg, Allensworth, and
Johnson continue:
Nearly all teachers at Lake Erie report problems with robbery in the
building, gang activity, fights, disorder, and disrespect, and three-quarters of
teachers report that students threaten them with violence. Interactions
between students and teachers are frequently hostile and mutually
disrespectful; students’ and teachers’ frustration with one another are easily
visible. An algebra teacher at Lake Erie complains that constant disruption
“impedes the teaching process”; repeated conflicts make it difficult, he
continues, for teachers “to reach students who want to learn as deeply as you
know [they] could.” Another teacher observes, “I see behavior problems I
have never seen before . . . I get cursed out almost daily.” . . . Violence inside
and outside the school creates a climate of mistrust, antagonism, and fear.
Id.
318. See supra Part II.A.

2014:79

School Surveillance

135

such judgments. My response to this criticism is again twofold. First,
courts already make assessments regarding the learning environment
under the First Amendment analysis. For example, as Tinker explains,
school officials may restrict students’ free speech rights if speech
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others.”319 Second, courts have the responsibility
to limit school officials’ actions when those actions impinge upon
students’ civil rights. In fact, in the current politically charged
environment, courts have the responsibility to clarify students’ Fourth
Amendment rights and should insist that schools preserve students’
privacy and dignity by finding alternative ways to deter school crime,
especially in light of the fact that minorities are disproportionately
subjected to these intrusive measures.
2. THE COMBINED EFFECT AMOUNTS TO A SUBSTANTIAL INTRUSION
A second way in which a court can afford more weight to students’
privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment is to rethink the concept
of “intrusion.” As explained above, lower courts routinely justify the use
of a variety of random, suspicionless search practices in schools because
they deem each individual search in isolation as “minimally intrusive.”320
This Article maintains that a more appropriate analysis of intrusion
involves examining the cumulative effect of using all these measures
together instead of evaluating each measure in isolation. Indeed, it is the
cumulative effect of these measures that amounts to a substantial
invasion of students’ privacy, harming students’ educational progress.
The recent testimony from the U.S. Senate Committee Hearing on
Ending the School-to-Prison Pipeline provides a sobering illustration of
how intrusive using a combination of these surveillance methods can
be.321 Edward Ward, a twenty-year-old honor roll student at DePaul
University, attended public schools on the West Side of Chicago, where
90 percent of the students were low-income and 100 percent were
minority students.322 Ward described his school as his “own personal
prison.”323 He stated that “[f]rom the moment we stepped through the
doors in the morning, we were faced with metal detectors, x-ray

319.
(2007).
320.
321.
322.
323.

See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
See supra Part III.A.
See Edward Ward Testimony, supra note 1, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
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machines and uniformed security. Upon entering school, it was like we
stepped into a prison.”324 He continues:
My school’s environment was very tense; the halls were full
with school security officers whose only purpose seemed to be
to serve students with detentions or suspensions. Many of the
school security officers were very disrespectful to students;
some of them spoke to us as if we were animals. They were
constantly yelling and antagonizing us from the moment we
stepped into the halls until we reached our destination. This
was nerve-wracking for me, because although I was an honor
student, I felt constantly in a state of alert, afraid to make even
the smallest mistake or create a noise that could enable the
security officers to serve me with a detention. Instead of feeling
like I could trust them, I felt I couldn’t go to them for general
security issues because I would first be interrogated before
anything would get done. . . . The officers don’t get any special
training to be in the school so they don’t treat us like we are
misbehaving; they treat us like we are committing crimes. . . .
These policies and actions disheartened me. I could slowly see
the determination to get an education fade from the faces of my
peers because they were convinced that they no longer
mattered, . . . the last thing that would work is to place them in
institutions of confinement and control.325
In another example, Minerva Dickson views her high school as a
prison.326 Every day before being allowed to enter, Minerva waits in a
long line as each student is subject to various security checks.327 When
Minerva finally arrives to the front of the line, she first swipes an
identification card through a machine.328 Then she walks to the metal
detectors that are monitored by several police officers.329 While the
police officers stand watching, Minerva removes her jewelry, hairpins,
and shoes, then puts her personal bags on a conveyor belt to be
scanned.330 Finally, Minerva stands with her arms out and legs spread as
an officer runs a security wand around her body.331 Minerva then collects

324.
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Id. at 3–4.
See Khan, supra note 167.
Id.
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her things, puts on her shoes, and hurries to her first class.332 When asked
how she feels about school security, she responds, “They treat[] us like
criminals. It ma[kes] me hate school. When you cage up students like
that it doesn’t make us safe, it makes things worse.”333
In these examples, and probably thousands of others, it is clear that
something fundamentally wrong is happening. While being treated like a
criminal may involve more than a privacy violation and intrudes on one’s
dignity, it also seems clear that the cumulative effect of using all of these
measures together amounts to a significant intrusion of students’ privacy
interests and can and should be evaluated as such.
CONCLUSION
After several highly publicized incidents of school violence, the
public school environment—just like the public environment—is
changing. The use of surveillance methods, which was uncommon
decades ago, is now commonplace among schools. Yet, empirical
evidence demonstrates that not all schools rely on surveillance methods
in the same manner. A recent empirical study shows that low-income and
minority students are much more likely to experience intense, prison-like
conditions than other students, even after accounting for conditions that
plausibly would lead school officials to adopt strict security measures
such as neighborhood crime, school crime, and school disorder.
While the appropriate response to these findings must be
multi-faceted, courts have an important role to play. This Article offers a
reformulated balancing test under the Fourth Amendment to address
these conditions that is rooted in the Court’s analysis of students’ rights
under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. A modified Fourth
Amendment framework has the advantage of safeguarding all students’
Fourth Amendment rights and rectifying the deleterious environment that
intense surveillance conditions create in schools. Further, because
students of color are more often subjected to such intense environments,
applying this test will help address the disproportionate use of strict
security measures on minorities. While addressing this problem is only
one aspect of the inequalities that minority students experience in
schools, it is a key component to addressing the school-to-prison pipeline
and creating quality educational experiences that most white students
enjoy and all students deserve.
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